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HATE SPEECH, OFFENSIVE SPEECH, AND PUBLIC
DISCOURSE IN AMERICA*
Edward J. Eberle**
In this article, Professor Eberle discusses several limitations on
governmental power to regulate public discourse. After examining the
United States Supreme Court decisions of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, Professor Eberle concludes that govern-
ment should refrain from regulating speech itself. Rather, any restric-
tions should focus strictly on the problematic conduct underlying the
speech which justifies regulation. Professor Eberle also concludes that
the Court has implicitly recognized two distinct subcategories of "con-
tent" discrimination and viewpoint discrimination. Both subcategories
are presumptively unconstitutional and nominally subject to conven-
tional strict scrutiny. The Court, however, finds viewpoint discrimina-
tion more dangerous to public discourse. Therefore, the Court has in
practice applied a heightened review to instances of viewpoint dis-
crimination under the guise of conventional strict scrutiny. This
heightened scrutiny explains decisions, like R.A.V., in which the Court
invalidated seemingly constitutional statutes regulating public
discourse.
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Since at least its decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the
Supreme Court has pursued a vision in its First Amendment free speech
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court's vision in public discourse law can be traced to
even earlier cases such as Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Justice Bran-
deis' great concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). For a discussion
of Cantwell v. Connecticut, see infra notes 306-24 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence with respect to public discourse, that realm of expression in
which citizens speak to or about one another or society, however civil,
rude or passionate, in the process of deciding who we are as a people,
what values we hold, and what ends are worth pursuing, either individu-
ally or collectively. 2 That vision is directed to promoting both individual-
ity and diversity in the dissemination of opinions and tolerance of such
differing perspectives, all in the hope of achieving a more fully realized
"better" person and "a more perfect polity."' 3 Underlying this vision is
the bedrock First Amendment principle that governments must be neu-
tral with respect to the content of expression. As Justice Kennedy re-
cently explained: "To endure the speech of false ideas or offensive
content and then to counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralis-
tic society, a society which insists upon open discourse towards the end of
a tolerant citizenry."4
The Court has hammered out this vision upon the anvils of the cen-
tral issues of the day. In past times, these issues included: determining
the line between constitutionally protected speech and proscribable pub-
lic libel,5 the Ku Klux Klan's virulent response to the Civil Rights Move-
ment," and the caustic debate over the course of our country's policy
during the Vietnam War.7
Today, the Supreme Court addresses no less provocative issues, and
in two recent decisions the Court has spoken to the issue of hate-inspired
conduct. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul," the Court employed the First
Amendment to invalidate a St. Paul city ordinance which prohibited bias-
motivated disorderly conduct. Specifically, the Court invalidated the ordi-
nance because it selectively proscribed only threats or slurs based on
"race, color, creed, religion or gender" as compared to the broader cate-
gory of all threats or epithets, whether or not racially, creed, or gender
based.9 One year later, however, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,0 the Court
2. Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Para-
digms of Free Expression, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 103, 113 (1992); Robert C. Post, The Consti-
tutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 626, 671 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Public
Discourse].
3. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
4. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992). Lee was decided only two days after
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
5. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that advocacy of
ideas is constitutionally protected unless violence or unlawfulnesss is imminently likely to
occur).
7. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding government cannot dictate mini-
mum level of civility in public discourse and, therefore, First Amendment protects wearing
jacket which bears message "Fuck the Draft").
8. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
9. Id. at 2547-48. For example, under the St. Paul ordinance, threats containing such
words as "Nigger," "Honkie," or "Kike" would be prohibited since based on race, color,
creed, or religion, but threats using such words as "Bastard," "Jerk," or "Fascist" would not
be prohibited.
10. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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sustained a statute that enhanced criminal penalties for hate-inspired
crimes. The Court justified this apparent discrepancy with a finding that
the Wisconsin statute regulated only conduct, not speech, and thus the
First Amendment was not implicated.11 Through these cases the Court
squarely confronted a central issue of our day, the social problem of hate
speech, expression (and behavior) virulently and viciously directed at per-
sons on account of their race, color, creed, gender or other status.12
Like earlier cases addressing controversial First Amendment issues,
both R.A.V. and Mitchell uncover new ground in freedom of speech law.
In R.A.V., the Court chose to continue its expansion of the First Amend-
ment"3 by determining that under certain circumstances the amendment
will protect even hate speech constituting fighting words, a category of
expression historically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court
extended the First Amendment principle of content-neutrality to such
fighting words despite the painfully high price that must be borne with
respect to such hateful and destructive expression. In Mitchell, the Court
signaled that the focus of governmental regulation of such undesirable
behavior should shift from the content of speech to the underlying con-
duct, thus resuscitating in new guise the speech/conduct dichotomy im-
plicit in freedom of speech law.
Although decided a year apart, one might properly view R.A.V. and
Mitchell as companion cases that address many foundational questions
about the role free speech plays, or should play, in our pluralistic, demo-
cratic society. R.A.V. illustrates how to expand, in a principled manner,
the content of the First Amendment. Mitchell, by relying upon the
speech/conduct dichotomy, demonstrates how the reach of the amend-
ment might be restrained. Viewed in tandem, R.A.V. and Mitchell
demonstrate how to resolve conflicts between the right to freedom of
11. Id. at 2200-01.
12. Professor Schauer defines hate speech broadly to encompass
first, utterances intended to and likely to have the effect of inducing others to
commit acts of violence or acts of unlawful discrimination based on the race,
religion, gender, or sexual orientation of the victim; and, second, utterances ad-
dressed to and intended to harm the listener (or viewer) because of her race,
religion, gender, or sexual orientation.
Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1349 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech]. The primary concern of this article is treatment of
racist speech in public discourse. With this focus, Professor Matsuda's definition of racist
hate speech may prove useful. "1. The message is of racial inferiority; 2. The message is
directed against a historically oppressed group; and 3. The message is persecutorial, hateful,
and degrading." Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
tim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320, 2357 (1989).
13. The Court first signaled its desire to expand the content of the First Amendment
beyond historical limitations in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where
the Court accorded broad constitutional protection to public defamation. Since New York
Times, the Court has broadened the First Amendment's scope to protect offensive speech,
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); outrageous speech, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988); and insulting speech, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) and
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), among other reconsiderations of historical limita-
tions on the reach of free speech.
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speech and other vital interests, especially other constitutional rights.
These two cases show how best to accommodate serious personal or social
harm juxtaposed against speech rights without risk to the integrity of the
First Amendment. These are forefront issues for the future evolution of
the First Amendment, and these cases provide a good setting in which to
examine them.
Part I of this article examines this new direction in First Amendment
law by evaluating the doctrinal foundations of R.A.V. and their implica-
tions for the amendment. Part II discusses how the Court, in R.A.V and
Mitchell, once again demonstrated its overriding commitment to free
speech as the preferred set of freedoms in our constitutional value struc-
ture. Part III examines the potential for both progress and pitfall in First
Amendment law presented by R.A. V.'s seemingly broad application of the
content-neutrality principle to all areas of speech.
Part IV of this article recognizes the danger that a broad and doctri-
naire application of the content-neutrality principle may cause a "doctri-
nal dilution" of the First Amendment.14 It then examines and clarifies the
underlying rationale of R.A.V. to help avoid such a dilution. The conclu-
sion reached is that, even after R.A.V., the government may still engage
in subject matter-content discrimination, if such discrimination is nar-
rowly tailored and justified by a compelling governmental interest.1" If,
however, the government engages in viewpoint discrimination, an espe-
cially disfavored form of content-discrimination because it raises the
specter of government censorship of ideas, the level of appropriate scru-
tiny is raised. To such cases, the Court properly applies the most exacting
scrutiny possible, by requiring not only that the government have a com-
pelling interest, but also that the least restrictive governmental action be
available to promote such an interest.' Recognition of this two-level ap-
proach to content discrimination explains both the Court's decision in
R.A.V. and the content distinction in First Amendment law, and lends
needed coherence to this beguiling area of First Amendment law.
Part V explains why this clarification of R.A.V. is more consistent
with the Court's overall vision in public discourse jurisprudence, where it
has quite deliberately promoted an unfettered, robust, and wide-open de-
bate on public issues. Rather than silencing speech on the basis of its
content, majoritarian preferences must be expressed through regulation
of conduct, education, or counter-speech remedies unless exigent circum-
stances manifesting clear, present, and serious dangers to individuals or
society make such remedies wholly unworkable. The Court has thus
14. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). The First Amendment
does not value all speech equally. Political speech receives the highest protection, while
other forms of speech, such as commercial speech and obscenity, receive less protection.
"Doctrinal dilution" would result from an application of the content-neutrality principle to
all forms of speech such that higher-valued speech is judged by the standards of lower-
valued speech.
15. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
16. For further discussion of the "strict scrutiny plus necessity" test, see infra notes
274-78 and accompanying text.
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carved out public discourse as a presumptively protected realm of activ-
ity, immune from governmental regulation unless justified by such exi-
gent circumstances.
Last, in view of these principles, part VI applies this regulatory strat-
egy to the issue of hate speech. Part VI.A first evaluates the content of
hate speech, then concludes that while ugly, the truths revealed by such
speech are too important to be suppressed. Rather, hate speech should be
confronted squarely and countered effectively through the honesty of
open discourse. Part VI.B scrutinizes the particular form of hate speech
disseminated in R.A.V. It concludes that burning a cross in the dead of
night within a black family's fenced yard merits precise regulation of the
particular contextual problems presented, such as invasion of the privacy
of one's home, personalized threats, intimidation or harassment, and cap-
tive audience. The approach thus illustrates a way to identify specific
harms associated with hate speech and properly to deal with them in a
manner consistent with the First Amendment. This strategy might also
be applied profitably to other areas of First Amendment law, such as the
general problem of incivility in public discourse, commercial speech, or
instances of speech mixed with conduct.
I. R.A.V., THE PROBLEM OF HATE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The facts of R.A.V. well illustrate the serious problem of hate speech
in American society. On June 21, 1990, several teenagers in the city of St.
Paul, Minnesota, spent the pre-dawn hours taping broken chair legs to-
gether to form a cross."' Once completed, they placed their crudely-made
cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived near the house
where one of the teenagers was staying and set the cross aflame.' 8
This burning of the cross, like the wearing of a white robe before a
black audience, or the displaying of Nazi swastikas before an audience of
Jews or other holocaust survivors, can reasonably be interpreted only as a
message of hate directed at the targeted victims. This problem of hate
speech has grown in recent years, perhaps reflecting deep unease in
American society.' 9
17. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (1992).
18. Id. The black family, the Joneses, had recently moved into the white, working
class neighborhood to escape urban ills. They were the first black family to move to the
neighborhood. The perpetrator and some of his friends were at the house of a friend who
lived across the street from the Jones family. The friends, who had been drinking, began to
talk about "burning" some Blacks. They then constructed a crude cross by taping together
pieces of a broken chair. Next, they wrapped the cross in terrycloth, planted it in the Jones'
yard, and ignited it. Don Terry, Rights Advocates Uncertain About Ruling's Impact, N.Y.
TiMES, June 23, 1992, at A16.
19. "[Blias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict dis-
tinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest." Wisconsin v. Mitch-
ell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993). It is evident that hate-inspired violence is on the rise. See
Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias
Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 680 n.31, 716 n.163
(1993) [hereinafter Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes] ("There is ample evidence upon
[Vol. 291140
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The St. Paul ordinance at issue in R.A.V. was directed at this sort of
racially motivated hate speech.20 As phrased, the ordinance prohibited
conduct expressing symbolic and vicious hatred toward those people in
American society considered to be "discrete and insular minorities,"21
such as nonwhites, women, or religious minorities. The underlying con-
duct of placing the cross on the lawn might have been punished on the
basis of Minnesota statutes covering terroristic threats, arson, or criminal
damage to property.22 The city of St. Paul, however, chose to prosecute
the perpetrators on the basis of its bias-motivated crime ordinance,
thereby raising the First Amendment freedom of speech issues eventually
ruled on by the United States Supreme Court.
This ordinance was not carefully drafted and, if read literally, was
substantially overbroad; thus, it was subject to attack under the over-
breadth doctrine. 23 One of the perpetrators in R.A.V. made such an at-
which a state could rely to support a finding that bias crimes are increasing in frequency.");
Matsuda, supra note 12, at 2321 nn.4-5. Most other countries of the world prohibit hate
speech, illustrating, by contrast, the extraordinary protection afforded speech in America.
See id. at 2341-48 (describing how the International Convention of the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination outlaws racist hate propaganda); Schauer, Uncoupling Free
Speech, supra note 12, at 1350 n.89 (discussing laws of countries that prohibit incitement to
racial hatred, including Canada, England, Germany and Sweden). See also Erich Stein, His-
tory Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against "Auschwitz"-And Other Lies;
85 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1986) (describing German law prohibiting racial hate speech).
20. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public property a symbol, object, appellation, characteriza-
tion or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender com-
mits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1992)).
21. The phrase "discrete and insular minorities" encompasses nonwhites, females, and
religious minorities. The language comes from Justice Stone's famous footnote in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), wherein Stone set forth bases
for application of heightened judicial scrutiny. Certainly St. Paul was motivated by a desire
to protect minority groups, although the ordinance was neutral on its face.
22. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.1. The city also brought a charge of racially motivated
assault which defendant, Robert A. Viktora (R.A.V.), did not challenge. Robert A. Viktora
was a minor at the time of the incident. Accordingly, he was then publicly identified by his
initials, R.A.V. One of Viktora's accomplices, Miller,
was indicted under federal housing law, 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988), for conspiring
to interfere with the Jones family's right of access to housing by intimidation
and the threat of force. Miller ultimately pleaded guilty to the federal charge,
acknowledging the crosses were burned with the intention of scaring the Jones
family into moving because they were African-Americans.
Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 702 n.112.
23. The overbreadth doctrine was explicitly established in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972), and later qualified by Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), as here de-
scribed. The doctrine is an exception to the normal standing rules and permits litigants "to
challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because
of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 612. However, because the doctrine is "strong medicine", id. at 613, "the over-
breadth of a statute must not only be real, but must be substantial, as well, judged in rela-
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tack on the ordinance since it seemed to encompass such concededly
protected activities as burning crosses and displaying Nazi swastikas or
other emblems of racial or ethnic supremacy in constitutional fora.24 This
argument met with success at the trial level where the court dismissed
the case on the overbreadth theory.25
The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to salvage the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance by limiting its reach to "fighting words. '26 As
defined by the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,7 this category of
expression is composed of "conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to
incite immediate violence" and has long been deemed unprotected by the
First Amendment. '2 With the reach of the ordinance so limited, Minne-
sota's Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, even though the revised ordi-
nance prohibited only fighting words based on race, color, gender, and
religion as compared to the broader category of all fighting words.2 ' The
United States Supreme Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's
interpretation that the St. Paul ordinance only reached those expressions
constituting "fighting words" within the meaning of ChaplinskyY' In this
way, the Court pointedly declined to decide the precise reach, if any, of
the exception provided by the fighting words doctrine today.31
Nevertheless, the Court unanimously invalidated the St. Paul ordi-
nance, with the justices splintering sharply over the rationale for such
invalidation. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court offered a provocative
reconceptualization of First Amendment law, signalling a new direction in
the lively course of the amendment. Even accepting Minnesota's interpre-
tation that all the expression covered by the ordinance was proscribable
as fighting words, his opinion for the Court "nonetheless conclude[ed]
that the ordinance [was] facially unconstitutional in that it prohibit[ed]
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects that the
speech addresses. 3 2 The Court then cited a string of cases in support of
its statement that such "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively
invalid."33
tion to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615.
24. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
25. Id.
26. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).
27. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572
(recognizing for first time government's power to prohibit "fighting words")).
29. Id. at 511.
30. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
31. The Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction on the basis of Chaplinsky's for-
mulation of fighting words since that case in 1942. While certainly "a root intuition behind
the fighting words doctrine is that the First Amendment does not forbid the punishment of
face-to-face insults meant to and likely to provoke fisticuffs," Akhil R. Amar, Comment,
The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124,
127 n.23 (1992), the strength of the doctrine seems extremely weak today. The continued
viability of the fighting words doctrine is thus a fair question.
32. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
33. Id.
[Vol. 291142
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While content-neutrality is a bedrock principle of First Amendment
law, the principle had never before been thought to apply to categories of
unprotected expression, such as fighting words or obscenity, convention-
ally thought to be wholly proscribable 4 In R.A.V., however, Justice
Scalia concluded that such expression was not beyond the reach of the
First Amendment entirely. Rather, Justice Scalia perceived that these
proscribable categories of expression "mean ... that these areas of
speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because
of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, and
so forth), not because they are categories of speech entirely invisible to
the Constitution that may be subject to content discrimination unrelated
to their distinctively proscribable content." 5 In fact, the Court noted that
fighting words are often quite expressive and their content is emphati-
cally not "in all respects 'worthless and undeserving of constitutional
protection.' -38 Rather, whether a particular category of expression is con-
stitutionally proscribed depends on what aspect of the expression is
regulated.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's judgment but not in its
opinion, characterized the Court's revision of the categorical approach in
the following manner:
It is not ... that certain "categories" of expression are "unprotected,"
but rather that certain "elements" of expression are wholly "proscrib-
able." To the Court, an expressive act, like a chemical compound, con-
sists of more than one element. Although the act may be regulated
because it contains a proscribable element, it may not be regulated on
the basis of another (nonproscribable) element it contains. Thus, ob-
scene antigovernment speech may be regulated because it is obscene,
but not because it is antigovernment. 7
These words apply with equal force to the ordinance at issue in R.A.V.
Under the Court's refurbished doctrinal framework, while government
could regulate fighting words (a proscribable element), it could not regu-
late just fighting words that are politically incorrect (a nonproscribable
element of content discrimination).3 8
Probing further, the R.A.V. Court found that the ordinance discrimi-
nated not only on the basis of content, but also on the basis of view-
point,39 a highly disfavored form of content discrimination. As the Court
simply stated, "Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable."40 The or-
dinance enacted by St. Paul, however, seemingly violated this basic prin-
ciple of First Amendment law. In fact, city officials conceded in various
34. This was Justice White's view. Id. at 2551-54 (White, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 2545.
36. Id. at 2544 (quoting White, J., concurring, at 2533).
37. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 2540.
39. Id. at 2547.
40. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
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statements made during the R.A.V. litigation that the object of the ordi-
nance was regulation of messages of bias-motivated hatred. 41 This infor-
mation persuaded the Court that a "realistic possibility [of] official
suppression of ideas" was present. 42 While dislodging such suppression
appears to have been the majority's main motivation, other members of
the Court questioned the majority's motivations. Justice Blackmun even
suspected that the majority held a desire to decide issues of politically
correct speech and cultural diversity rather than address the issue of cen-
sorship actually before it. 43
Perhaps recognizing its overstatement, the Court undercut its posi-
tion somewhat, stating that selective regulation may be permissible, so
long as the purpose of the restriction is not "even arguably 'conditioned
upon the sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may intend to
say.' "44 The Court further described several acceptable instances of such
viewpoint-"neutral" bases for content discrimination. 45 Within proscrib-
able categories, content discrimination can occur when the speech "con-
sists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable,"'46 when the object of the discrimination is to control "par-
ticular 'secondary effects' of the speech, ' 47 or when a "content-based sub-
41. For example, consider these observations of the Court:
St. Paul concedes in its brief that the ordinance applies only to "racial, religious,
or gender-specific symbols" such as a "burning cross, Nazi swastika or other in-
strumentality of like import." Indeed, St. Paul argued in the Juvenile Court that
"[t]he burning of a cross does express a message and it is, in fact, the content of
that message which the St. Paul Ordinance attempts to legislate."
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 2547.
43. For example, consider Justice Blackmun's assessment: "I fear that the Court has
been distracted from its proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue over 'politi-
cally correct speech' and 'cultural diversity,' neither of which is presented here. If this is the
meaning of today's opinion, it is perhaps even more regrettable." Id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
44. Id. at 2547 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting in part)).
45. "Indeed, to validate such selectivity (where totally proscribable speech is at issue)
it may not even be necessary to identify any particular 'neutral' basis, so long as the nature
of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official sup-
pression of ideas is afoot." Id. at 2547.
46. Id. at 2545. "To illustrate: A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity
which is the most patently offensive in its prurience-i.e., that which involves the most
lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for example, only that obscen-
ity which includes offensive political messages." Id. at 2546.
47. Id. at 2546. "[A]nother valid basis for according differential treatment to even a
content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be associated
with particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without
reference to the content of the ... speech.' "Id. For example, in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court upheld a zoning restriction prohibiting adult motion
picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of a family residence, church, park, or school
because the regulation was based on the "secondary effects of adult theaters [on the sur-
rounding community], not [on] the content of adult films themselves." Id. at 47. The Court
upheld Renton's zoning restriction based on the district court's possibly suspect finding that
the city did not intend to restrict the First Amendment. Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting
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category of ... speech [is] swept up incidentally within the reach of a
statute directed at conduct rather than speech."4 8
In assessing the St. Paul ordinance against this framework, the Court
found none of the exceptions to be applicable.49 Not even St. Paul's con-
cededly compelling official interest in ensuring "the basic human rights of
members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination
... to live in peace where they wish" could justify the city's hostility
toward politically incorrect hate speech.50 According to the Court, dis-
crimination, based on the speaker's viewpoint, may "be employed only
where [such discrimination] is necessary to serve the asserted [compel-
ling] interest." 51 The "existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives
thus 'undercut[s] significantly'" any defense of such a statute.52 Since
there did exist a content-neutral alternative to the St. Paul ordinance-a
ban on all fighting words-the Court struck down the ordinance.
With its analysis in R.A.V., the Court seems to have heightened the
level of scrutiny applied to governmental restrictions of speech which dis-
criminate based on viewpoint. Had the conventional strict scrutiny analy-
sis been applied in R.A.V., the Court reasonably could have determined
that St. Paul's ordinance was narrowly tailored and was in furtherance of
the concededly compelling interest in securing equality. In fact, Justice
White advocated such a position.5 3 But, instead of applying this tradi-
tional test, the Court heightened the level of scrutiny by requiring that
the means not only be "narrowly tailored," but also that the means be
"necessary" to serve the compelling interest.54 The resulting analysis thus
combined the traditional strict scrutiny analysis with the added require-
ment that the measure be "necessary" in the sense that no less restrictive,
content-neutral alternative be available.
The Court's reconception of the strict scrutiny test for viewpoint dis-
crimination signals several new developments in First Amendment law.
First, the Court's careful exploration of expression in all of its multi-fac-
eted aspects underscores the high value it attaches to expression. The fact
Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of Penalty Enhancement For Bias
Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 178, 203 n.165 (1993).
The use of this technique to transform content-selective regulations into content-neu-
tral regulations was strongly criticized by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-37 (1988). See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Hate Speech Case: A
Pyrrhic Victory For Freedom of Speech?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 285, 295 n.69 (1992).
48. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546. For example, "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,'
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices." Id. For a discussion of the distinction between
speech and conduct, see infra part V.C.
49. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
50. Id. at 2549.
51. Id. (citing Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992)).
52. Id. at 2550 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)).
53. Id. at 2554-55 (White, J., concurring). This is also the basis on which the Minne-
sota Supreme Court decided the case of In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511
(Minn. 1991).
54. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
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that the Court was willing to consider a communicative act feature by
feature to squeeze out every bit of its expressive value indicates the
Court's view of speech first and foremost as an end in itself. The Court
has also recognized, however, that speech is a means to facilitate other
important ends, such as self-government 5 and the pursuit of truth. 6 Sec-
ond, given the Court's high regard for freedom of expression, no category
of speech should be wholly beyond constitutional protection. Rather, as
R.A.V. illustrates, a more probing assessment is necessary to determine
what aspects of the expression at issue merit protection or nonprotection
under the First Amendment. This painstaking approach obviously has
important implications for other categories of expression thought to be
beyond the pale of the First Amendment, most notably obscenity. 7
Third, the Court's valuation of free speech even over the freedom of
equality again underscores its overriding commitment to First Amend-
ment freedoms. In sum, the Court's opinion in R.A.V. clearly expresses
the common view that free speech is the preeminent right in our regime
of constitutional guarantees.
Nevertheless, despite the Court's noble commitment to free speech,
its opinion in R.A.V. presents pitfalls as well as progress in First Amend-
ment law. In their concurrences, Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens
were quick to seize upon and amplify three main features of the opinion
that may represent pitfalls in the development of First Amendment law.
First, the Court's revision of the categorical approach in further delineat-
ing between protected and unprotected speech, while laudable, muddies
that division by virtue of its complication.58 This creates new uncertainty
and thereby risks unprincipled decisionmaking in defining the boundaries
of the amendment. Second, the Court's "new absolutism in the prohibi-
tion of content-based regulation severely contorts the fabric of settled
First Amendment law."'59 This contortion threatens to cause an unrav-
eling of First Amendment jurisprudence given that the First Amendment
is founded on distinctions based on the content of speech. Third, the
Court's "all-or-nothing" approach to content discrimination also seems to
level the treatment of qualitatively different harms to society or persons
juxtaposed against the amendment.6 0 These developments present dan-
gers to First Amendment interests. Especially dangerous is the risk of
doctrinal dilution, a "dilution . . . by a leveling process, of the force of
the amendment's guarantee."61 Each of these potentials for progress or
pitfall in the amendment is worthy of exploration.
55. New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
56. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
57. For a discussion of obscenity, see infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
58. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2564 (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
61. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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II. WHY FREE SPEECH Is OUR PREFERRED FREEDOM
The Court's decision in R.A.V. reaffirms the preeminence of free
speech in our constitutional value structure.6 2 Theoretically, free speech is
intrinsically valuable as a chief means by which we develop our faculties
and control our destinies.6 3 Free speech is also of instrumental value in
facilitating other worthy ends such as democratic or personal self-govern-
ment,6 4 public and private decisionmaking,65 and the advancement of
knowledge and truth. 6 Ultimately, the value of free speech rests upon a
complex set of justifications, as compared to reliance on any single
foundation.6 7
The majority of the Court in R.A.V. preferred a nonconsequentialist
view, finding that speech is valuable as an end itself, independent of any
consequences that it might produce. In this view, free speech is an essen-
tial part of a just and free society that treats all people as responsible
moral agents. Accordingly, people are entrusted with the responsibility of
making judgments about the use or abuse of speech.' From this vantage
point, the majority saw a certain moral equivalency in all speech. Even
hate speech merits protection under the First Amendment, because all
62. "[F]reedom of thought and speech ... [are] the matrix, the indispensable condi-
tion, of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
63. Professor Redish is a main proponent of defining the First Amendment in terms of
only one true value, self-realization. Self-realization includes both "the inherent value in
allowing individuals to control their own destiny, and the instrumental value in developing
individuals' mental faculties so that they may reach their full intellectual potential." Martin
H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor
Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 679-80 (1982). Professor Richards has also argued that self-
determination underlies the amendment, stating that
the significance of free expression rests on the central human capacity to create
and express symbolic systems, such as speech, writing, pictures, and music ....
Freedom of expression permits and encourages the exercise of these capacities.
• . . In so doing, it nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person.
The value of free expression, in this view, rests on its deep relation to self-
respect arising from autonomous self-determination without which the life of the
spirit is meager and slavish.
David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
64. Professor Meiklejohn first drafted the seminal argument that democratic self-gov-
ernment undergirds the First Amendment. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITIcAL FREEDOM
55-56 (1960) ("It stands alone as the cornerstone of the structure of self-government. If that
uniqueness were taken away, government by consent of the governed would have perished
from the earth.").
65. See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 411, 451-53 (1992) (describing relationship between public and private
decisionmaking in First Amendment theory) [hereinafter Eberle, Commercial Speech
Paradigm].
66. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
THOMAS EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
67. Eberle, Commercial Speech Paradigm, supra note 65, at 424, 429-31.
68. Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles Over Free Speech, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS,
June 11, 1992, at 55, 57; Linda Greenhouse, The Court's 2 Visions of Free Speech, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A13.
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speech has intrinsic value. This is so because all speech, even hate speech,
is a communication to the world, and therefore implicates the speaker's
autonomy or self-realization. Additionally, any information might be val-
uable to a listener who can then decide its importance or how best to use
it. Accordingly, any suspicion or evidence of governmental censorship
must be vigilantly investigated.
The Court's view is evident in its concentration on the language of
the ordinance in comparison to the conduct at issue. Focusing on that
language, the Court scrutinized the speech at issue in three critical ways:
(1) it carefully explored a communicative act in all its multi-faceted
dimensions, (2) it reconceptualized categories of unprotected expression,
and (3) it valued free speech over freedom of equality.69
By contrast, the concurring Justices took a more consequential view,
believing that the value of speech depends on the ultimate ends pro-
moted. In this utilitarian view, speech is valuable insofar as it serves a
constructive, civilizing, or worthy purpose.70 However, speech that hurts,
destroys, or threatens serious harm to important personal or social inter-
ests has little or no value.71 Thus, for Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens,
and O'Connor, St. Paul was justified in placing restrictions on hateful
speech dealing with race, religion, or gender. However, other speech
within the category of fighting words could not be so restricted. According
to Justice White, such a "selective regulation [merely] reflect[ed] the
City's judgment that harms based on race, creed, religion or gender are
more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other fighting
words.' '72 The concurring Justices focused more on the conduct of the
communicative act than the communication itself.73 Thus, in their view,
the majority's approach created serious pitfalls for First Amendment
law.74
The fault line that split the Court reflects a debate over the value of
speech with deep roots in political theory and First Amendment law." As
a matter of political theory, the American tradition of liberal democracy
has historically been linked to the social contract theory, which grounds
the legitimacy of the state to the consent of the governed and establishes
significant limitations on the authority of government." For example, ac-
cording to John Locke, who greatly influenced the Framers of the Consti-
69. For an evaluation of the contribution of each of these three issues to First Amend-
ment law, see infra part III.A.
70. Dworkin, supra note 68, at 57; Greenhouse, supra note 68, at A13.
71. Dworkin, supra note 68, at 57; Greenhouse, supra note 68, at A13.
72. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2556 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
73. For example, Justice White saw the case as one of race, of protecting "groups that
have long been the targets of discrimination." Id. at 2557 (White, J., concurring). See also
Amar, supra note 31, at 148.
74. For a further discussion of the potential pitfalls of First Amendment law created
by the majority opinion in R.A.V., see infra part III.B.
75. Greenhouse, supra note 68, at A13.
76. See generally Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservativism as a Constitutional
Philosophy, 71 IOWA L. REv. 401 (1986).
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tution, individuals enter into a social contract with government to secure
their lives, liberty, and property, but expressly withhold consent to state
authority to interfere in other areas of their lives.7 Locke places control
of religious beliefs and expression outside the ambit of official authority,
and this vision took root in the framing of the Constitution."8
In more contemporary terms, this nonconsequential view of speech
has been articulated as allowing people to speak as they wish, free from
the threat of official sanction. The justifications for this modern view in-
clude: (1) The intrinsic value each of us has as a moral agent entitled to
dignity, respect, and autonomy;7 9 (2) the inherent right to self-determina-
tion or self-realization in developing and defining who we are;80 and (3)
the value in sustaining a free, unfettered, and robust exchange of ideas
independent of any truth that might be expected to result therefrom.8 '
In contrast, consequential justifications for speech have relied upon
the purposes served by speech rather than any intrinsic value in speech
per se.8 2 These theories have dominated much of the development of First
Amendment law in the twentieth century, beginning with the basic justi-
fication that speech advances knowledge and the discovery of truth. 3 The
Court has also relied, at times, on Professor Meiklejohn's self-government
theory, 4 which suggests that speech is valuable insofar as citizens can
77. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 147-48
(1989) (citing JOHN LOCKE, [SECOND] TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, reprinted in JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
§§ 123-131 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1947) (1690)).
78. Id. at 148 (citing JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, reprinted in
JOHN LOCKE. THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOL-
ERATION passim (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1947) (1690)). Indeed, Alexander Hamil-
ton argued that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary to a government of limited enumerated
powers. "I go further and affirm that bills of rights [are] not only unnecessary in the pro-
posed Constitution but would even be dangerous." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1966). Of course, freedoms of religion and expression
were ultimately specifically enumerated in the First Amendment. Moreover, "the concept of
a 'higher law,' protecting 'natural rights,' and taking precedence over ordinary positive law
as a matter of political obligation, was widely shared and deeply felt" by the "generation
that framed the Constitution." Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-16 (1975).
79. Richards, supra note 63, at 62-63; Dworkin, supra note 68, at 56-57.
80. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-48 (1989); MARTIN
H. REDISH. FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11-13 (1984).
81. For example, consider Justice Holmes' skepticism: "If, in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of
the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the independent value of free dialogue, see infra part V.
82. Greenawalt, supra note 77, at 128.
83. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(stating that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market"). See also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, reprinted in SE-
LECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 121 (M. Cowling ed., 1968).
84. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 n.20 (1982); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 n.6 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
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form, inform, and express the public will, and thereby be able actively to
"self-govern."8' 5 More recent consequentialist theories have hypothesized
that free speech is valuable because it promotes (1) interest accommoda-
tion and social stability;86 exposure and checking of official abuse;87 (2)
moral virtue, such as promotion of self-restraint and tolerance of contrary
opinions;8 8 or (3) simply the cathartic experience of engaging in dissent.8 9
The Court itself has never relied upon any single justification for
freedom of speech; but, instead it has adverted to a set of values that
includes self-government, self-realization, social stability, and advance-
ment of knowledge.90 As previously stated, the R.A.V. majority quite
clearly relied upon nonconsequential rationales for freedom of speech,
resolving to guard vigilantly against any governmental censorship, even
when the proscribed expression was hurtful and destructive to tangible
personal and social interests.
The Court's schism in R.A.V. reflects a certain contrariness that
seems to be an inevitable byproduct of expanding the scope of the First
Amendment. By now, of course, the central core of the amendment is well
fixed, consisting of "political, religious, artistic, academic, and scientific
expression.""' Even many intermediate categories of expression such as
commercial speech, labor speech, offensive speech, and public defamation
are relatively well settled.2 While important issues in these areas still
need to be resolved, for the most part these categories of speech are rela-
tively secure in their status as protected areas of First Amendment
expression.
The great challenge now present concerning the future evolution of
the amendment is to capture the yet remaining strands of social reality
meriting First Amendment protection on account of their value viv-A-vis
established free speech justifications.8 3 These uncharted areas are likely
to be located at the fringe of the amendment's reach.9'
85. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 64, at 55-56.
86. EMERSON, supra note 66, at 7.
87. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 523-28.
88. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 237-48 (1986).
89. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 86-109
(1990).
90. Eberle, Commercial Speech Paradigm, supra note 65, at 430 (citing Ronald A.
Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CINN. L. REV. 1317,
1327-28 (1988)).
91. Id. at 437.
92. Id.
93. For a discussion of First Amendment values under the consequentialist and non-
consequentialist view of free speech, see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
94. Examples of these "uncharted areas" include fighting words, pornography, obscen-
ity, expanded professional communications, and business, corporate, and securities speech
that arguably fits within an expanded commercial speech category. Eberle, Commercial
Speech Paradigm, supra note 65, at 441-42 n.129, 444. The emerging information age may
also present new questions for the First Amendment. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
FCC 2445 (1994) (extending First Amendment protection to cable television).
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Inevitably, however, broadening the scope of the First Amendment,
as R.A.V. dramatically does in making fighting words visible to the
amendment, creates innate tensions, contradictions, and ambiguities in
the relationship of the amendment to social reality. This relationship is,
of course, redefined in the process of fixing the content of the First
Amendment. For example, in R.A.V. the tension between free speech and
social reality was resolved in favor of stamping out suspected official cen-
sorship, a core First Amendment concern, over regulating hate-inspired
conduct (fighting words), a part of social reality hitherto thought beyond
the pale of the First Amendment. Such tensions, however, pose great
challenges to the substance and stability of the First Amendment and to
our reasoning capabilities. 5
How best to meet these challenges is an important concern for the
future development of First Amendment law, calling for great creativity
and precision in thinking. Two major inquiries are at issue. First, how to
capture the more complete meaning of the First Amendment by ex-
tending protection to those aspects of social reality meriting such protec-
tion. Second, how to comprehend and then effectively isolate serious
harms"6 associated with particular speech from the ambit of the First
Amendment without undermining the amendment's integrity.1
7
The resolution of these two questions need not be incompatible, as
an analysis of R.A. V. and Mitchell demonstrates. One way of accomplish-
ing this in relation to the problem of hate speech is by separating pros-
cribable conduct elements from protected expression.9 8 First, however, a
careful assessment of R.A.V.'s potential for both progress and pitfall in
the development of First Amendment law is necessary.
95. For a discussion of how this argument was previously developed and tested in rela-
tion to commercial speech, see Eberle, Commercial Speech Paradigm, supra note 65, at 507-
08.
96. Consider, for example, the physical assault or terrorist threat that accompanied
the burning cross in R.A.V. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.1 (describing the other criminal
statutes that defendant may have violated).
97. Given the strong foundation on which the modern First Amendment lies, the
amendment's continued expansion now seems to be a matter mainly of incremental pro-
gress. The greater effort is therefore found in the second question. A way must be found to
deal more effectively with the harm that might accompany such progress. Because of the
strong support for freedom of speech, we can now afford to apply heightened attention to
the harms associated with such freedom, including the real, personal, or social costs that
may be borne in service to the ideal of free speech. Where appropriate, serious harms should
be excluded from constitutional protection.
98. For a further discussion of this possible resolution, see infra part VI.
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III. THE POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS OR PITFALL IN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
A. R.A.V.'s Potential for Progress in First Amendment Law
1. Exploration of expression in all its dimensions
Given the preeminent value of free speech, it is appropriate for the
Supreme Court to scrutinize acts of communication with care to deter-
mine whether they merit protection under the First Amendment. In
R.A.V., the Court considered the prohibited expression element by ele-
ment in order to squeeze out every ounce of communicative value in the
First Amendment.9" The Court's methodology views expressive acts not
as undifferentiated wholes but rather as separate elements fused together
to form a whole. The communicative act can then be scrutinized to deter-
mine which elements warrant protection and which do not. For example,
in R.A. V., many elements of the cross burning might well have been pros-
cribable, 100 such as the trespass or arson. Other features of the act, how-
ever, were properly subject to First Amendment scrutiny.101
This meticulous analysis of expression advanced in R.A.V. is a note-
worthy contribution to First Amendment jurisprudence. First, the meth-
odology provides a valuable tool in understanding free speech. Analyzing
expression element by element allows for a closer assessment of the com-
ponents of the free speech dynamic. A more precise and complete under-
standing of the content of the First Amendment can thereby be achieved.
Second, in view of such understanding, the methodology provides a
sound basis upon which to expand the scope of the First Amendment into
uncharted areas. R.A.V. seems to signal that, where possible, such un-
charted areas should now be embraced within the amendment. In these
ways, R.A.V. foreshadows the next step in the progression of First
Amendment law, building on past expansions of the amendment. 10 2
Third, by forcing a closer evaluation of expression, R.A.V.'s method-
ology helps focus judges, prosecutors, and other decisionmakers on what
is relevant and ultimately worth protecting under the First Amendment.
Decisionmakers thereby properly can direct their efforts toward accom-
99. Massey, supra note 2, at 183.
100. The Supreme Court acknowledged that St. Paul could have constitutionally pros-
ecuted the defendant for arson, terroristic threats, and criminal damage to property.
101. The majority in R.A.V. was particularly troubled by the spectre of governmental
censorship raised by the ordinance's content discrimination. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548 ("St.
Paul has no ... authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring
the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules.").
102. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969) ("The wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type
of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (plurality) (stating that sit-in conducted in public
library by protestors protesting segregated library implicates constitutional right to peacea-
ble and orderly protest); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-03 (1940) (extending First
Amendment protection to distribution of information involving labor dispute and recogniz-
ing that certain conduct could constitute expression).
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plishing legitimate goals by proscribing specific elements such as arson or
trespass without restricting the speech itself. In this way, the value of the
expression can be separated from the context of its delivery, and govern-
ment better can focus on those context aspects 03 or on those conduct
elements10 4 that legitimately merit regulation.
Additionally, this methodology has ready extensions to other areas of
established First Amendment law. For example, use of it in commercial
speech would help separate elements of worthwhile expression such as
truthful, noncoercive information from aspects meriting governmental
control, such as deceptive, misleading or coercive features. 0 5 Further, the
methodology might help define with more precision the line between pro-
tected public libel and proscribable actual, malice defamation, 08 or the
line between protected advocacy of ideas and unprotected incitement to
imminent violence or unlawfulness. 0 7 At the very least, the R.A.V. meth-
odology can certainly aid in the resolution of the perplexing line between
speech and conduct. 08
Applying this element by element methodology to the communicative
act in R.A.V., Justice Scalia concluded that fighting words can be "quite
expressive indeed." 10 9 Fighting words express, in ways that other expres-
sion cannot, anger, frustration, hostility, rage, hatred, and other intense
emotions. Achieving a better understanding of the emotional, irrational,
or inexplicable is important to the development of certain speech areas,
such as electronic media speech, in-person solicitations, symbolic commu-
nication, artistic speech, and obscenity law.
Of course, other features of fighting words present legitimately pros-
cribable interests. For example, consider incitements to imminent vio-
lence or breach of the peace.' 10 In R.A.V., these features were the arson,
terroristic threat, or criminal assault."' Indeed, in view of the Court's
later decision in Mitchell, St. Paul could now express its dislike of such
bias-motivated conduct by enhancing the punishment of such conduct." 2
Significantly, however, while such overt conduct may be punished, speech
may not. 3 Thus, the Court is essentially teaching governments how to
act consistent with the Constitution: The government may channel be-
havior by effectuating legitimate health, safety, or welfare concerns, but it
103. Consider, for example, harassment, personal abuse, or invasion of privacy.
104. Consider, for example, terrorist threats or assault.
105. For an example of how this approach could be employed, see Eberle, Commercial
Speech Paradigm, supra note 65, at 476.
106. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
107. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam).
108. For a discussion of the line between speech and conduct, see infra part V.C.
109. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544.
110. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (stating that government may proscribe advo-
cacy of law violation if advocacy "is likely to incite or produce such action").
111. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.1., 2542 n.2.
112. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2196 (1994) (holding that statute en-
hancing punishment of racially motivated crimes is valid under First Amendment).
113. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
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cannot do so by restricting speech unless pursuant to a compelling state
interest.
11 4
2. Reconceptualization of categories of unprotected expression: the
increasing limitation of the categorical approach
In R.A.V. the Court reconceived the categorical approach to free
speech"1 5 by applying the content-neutrality doctrine to fighting words. 10
After R.A.V., categories no longer demarcate areas containing expression
that is absolutely without First Amendment protection;" 7 rather, such
categories are presumptively excepted from the amendment. It is still
necessary, however, to determine whether some radiation from the
amendment applies to the expression before it can be definitively decided
that the expression is, in whole or in part, without constitutional
protection.
In R.A.V., the Court used the radiation of content-discrimination to
invalidate St. Paul's selective regulation of politically incorrect fighting
words. Logically, other radiations should emanate from this new doctrine
as well. For example, the doctrine of prior restraint seems to be another
suitable candidate. Like content-discrimination, punishing expression
before it actually occurs is highly disfavored because it too raises the
specter of official censorship of ideas.111 Prior restraint has been widely
and indiscriminately used in the area of pornography to seize and sup-
press much expression before a determination of its constitutionality is
made. e19 In view of R.A.V. and its "radiations," a more careful and prob-
ing assessment of expression would seem to be required before any official
search or seizure. Other suitable First Amendment "radiations" might
114. The politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express [their] hostility [to bias-
motivated conduct]-but not through the means of imposing unique limitations
upon speakers [with] who[m] (however benightedly) [they] disagree .... "St.
Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without ad-
ding the First Amendment to the fire.
Id. at 2550.
115. The categorical approach to free speech "permit[s] restrictions upon the content
of speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.'" 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (stating that
"prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable in-
fringement on First Amendment rights"); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.").
119. See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) ("They seized all
magazines which '[iun our judgment' were obscene; when an officer thought 'a magazine...
ought to be picked up' he seized all copies of it."). For a discussion of Marcus and other
search and seizure cases, see generally Edward J. Eberle, Prior Restraint of Expression
Through the Private Search Doctrine, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 171 (1983) [hereinafter Eberle,
Prior Restraint].
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logically be the doctrines of chilling effect, vagueness, and overbreadth. 120
The Court's narrowing of the fighting words doctrine in R.A.V. is in
step with the Court's overall dramatic "narrowing [of] the scope of tradi-
tional categorical exceptions."1 2' This narrowing process began with12 2 a
reconceptualization of defamation. It was later extended to revision of
other areas such as obscenity 123  and profanity.' 24 Ultimately, it
culminated in the elimination of some traditional categories, such as com-
mercial speech.'2 5
The Court's narrowing of the areas beyond protection of the First
Amendment reflects the high value it places on free speech, both as an
end in itself and as a means to the accomplishment of other important
ends.' 28 From this vantage point, all expression is presumptively beyond
governmental power. 27 In service of this ideal, the Court seems commit-
ted to opening the channels of communication widely, allowing the trans-
mission of more ideas and information so that we may acquire "an ever
better understanding of reality"'' 28 or better achieve other desirable goals,
such as democratic self-government.
In view of this commitment to free discourse, the Court also has also
been reluctant to preempt any area of social reality from free discussion,
rejecting most new candidates for categorical exclusion. 129 Such preemp-
120. Indeed, these doctrines arguably already apply to otherwise proscribable speech.
See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (applying doctrines of chilling effect,
vagueness and overbreadth to otherwise proscribable fighting words). If so, R.A.V. makes
explicit a "radiation" doctrine that has been implicit in the Court's jurisprudence for some
time.
121. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543. Indeed, one might argue that all categorical exceptions
to First Amendment protection "operate, to some degree, to hamper public discourse." Mas-
sey, supra note 2, at 178.
122. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
123. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
124. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
125. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770-71 (1976).
126. For a discussion of the consequential and nonconsequential values of freedom of
speech, see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
127. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). In Cohen, the Court stated that the
First Amendment was
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of pub-
lic discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into
the hands of each of us ... in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political sys-
tem rests.
For a discussion of the comparative justification for freedom of speech, see supra notes 79-
90 and accompanying text.
128. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78
Nw. U. L. REv. 1137, 1155 (1983). "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic func-
tion in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropri-
ate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
129. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (rejecting exception for national flag); Hus-
tler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (rejecting libel of public figure as limitation on
11551994]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
tion is justifiable only in the face of extremely compelling reasons that
cannot effectively be addressed through conventional First Amendment
remedies, such as counter-speech, education, or punishment of conduct.130
Today, in light of the Court's trend, it would appear that there must be
serious, clear, and present harms to important individual or social inter-
ests to justify exclusion of any area from free debate. 31 These harms
should be provable apart from the content of the speech itself. Thus, in
refusing to create a First Amendment exception for bias-motivated hate
speech, and despite strong arguments favoring such a course,13 2 R.A. V.
parallels the Court's prior refusals to create exceptions for outrageous
speech'33 or expression involving the American flag.13 4
At a minimum, R.A.V. places an important limiting principle on con-
tent-based regulation, even within proscribable categories, such as fight-
ing words or obscenity."3 5 Governments may regulate speech within these
categories, but they can no longer discriminate on the basis of the content
of the speech.
R.A.V. may also signal a more general reevaluation of the status of
the fighting words doctrine, assuming that question is presented in the
right case. While the Court pointedly avoided such a reevaluation in
R.A.V., most of the foundation upon which the doctrine is based has been
eroded."36 Accordingly, perhaps it is time to jettison the doctrine in its
entirety, and instead rely upon punishment of any disorderly conduct
that might ensue, thereby shifting the focus of regulation from speech to
behavior." 7
public discourse).
130. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that eliminating porno-
graphic portrayal of children is such a compelling government interest).
131. In R.A.V., the Court admitted that St. Paul's interest in maintaining freedom of
equality among its citizens was a "compelling" interest. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538, 2549 (1992). The ordinance was invalidated despite the city's compelling interest be-
cause "adequate content-neutral alternatives" existed. Id. at 2550.
132. Consider, for example, the arguments of Professors Lawrence and Matsuda. Pro-
fessor Lawrence observed that "racist speech inflicts real harm. . . . to engage in a debate
about the first amendment [sic] and racist speech without a full understanding of the nature
and extent of the harm of racist speech risks making the first amendment [sic] an instru-
ment of domination rather than a vehicle of liberation." Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 458-59
[hereinafter Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech]. Therefore, the First Amendment should
permit regulation of "face-to-face racial vilification." Id. at 481. Professor Matsuda cites a
range of injuries caused by hate speech, including debilitating emotional distress, restriction
of personal freedom, and loss of self-esteem, and concludes that "racial hate messages"
should be categorically excepted from the First Amendment. Matsuda, supra note 12, at
2336-38, 2356-61.
133. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
134. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989).
135. Massey, supra note 2, at 179.
136. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (narrowing fighting words to
speech that induces violence).
137. FRANKLIN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SociETY 256-58 (1981). This
seems particularly appropriate given the careful scrutiny required of the circumstance in
which speech is made to make out a "fighting words" violation, and the "selective and dis-
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R.A.V.'s reconception of proscribed categories might signal a broader
reevaluation of other exceptions to First Amendment protection as well.
Such a reconsideration might logically come next in the category of ob-
scenity. Arguably, empirical data has failed to demonstrate a sufficient
link between obscenity and concrete harm to justify obscenity's categori-
cal exclusion from the First Amendment. 138 Assuming this is the case, and
in view of the doctrinal difficulties involved when dealing with obscenity,
it might be more profitable to treat obscenity like pornography currently
is treated under the First Amendment: Categorize it as a form of low-
value speech, subject to significant regulations of time, place, or
manner.139
Taken to the extreme, R.A.V. may even signal the Court's abandon-
ment of the categorical approach. This course, however, seems doubtful
and it is most likely that "a limited categorical approach . . . [as now
revised by R.A.V.] remain[s] an important part of our First Amendment
jurisprudence. '140 Such a conclusion would be entirely justifiable, for even
though all expression is presumptively protected by the First Amend-
ment, it is important to specify and clearly delineate those few narrow
areas in which the presumption can be overcome. A principled mecha-
nism would then exist for distinguishing protected from unprotected
speech. While R.A.V. revises this approach by converting the process
from an absolute to a presumptive rule, a clear basis still exists to demar-
cate this boundary: In the absence of an important radiation from the
First Amendment, governments may regulate the area in question.
In view of the complexity of modern free speech law, R.A.V.'s pre-
sumptive approach is a better legal strategy since it remains open to the
diversity, fluidity, and dynamics of social reality. Such an approach allows
the presentation of novel free speech questions rather than categorically
blocking them out. Absolute, all-or-nothing rules are not effective tools in
criminatory manner" in which the doctrine has been applied. Stephen W. Gard, Fighting
Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 580 (1980).
138. In a widely-publicized study, a commission under the leadership of then Attorney
General Edwin Meese concluded that "substantial exposure to sexually violent materials as
described here bears a causal relationship to antisocial acts of sexual violence." U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 326 (1986).
The scientific reliability of the Report has been widely questioned, however. "Three scien-
tists upon whose experiments the Commission relied have already criticized the Commission
for misusing their findings to support the conclusion of 'causation.'" Anthony D'Amato, A
New Political Truth: Exposure to Sexually Violent Materials Causes Sexual Violence, 31
WM. & MARY L. REV. 575, 576 n.4 (1990). According to Professor D'Amato, the report proves
at most a "correlation," not a causal link. Id. at 602-05. Professor D'Amato was a consultant
to the 1970 President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, which concluded that
"there was no causal relationship between exposure to sexually explicit materials and delin-
quent or criminal behavior." Id. at 575.
139. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (reviewing different strategies for handling obscenity, concluding all have been unsatis-
factory and, therefore, suggesting that focus of regulation of obscene material shift from
regulation of content to regulation of the means of distribution).
140. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
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the highly complex, nuanced world of the First Amendment, a world
which has changed greatly from the 1942 world of Chaplinsky to the 1992
world of R.A.V.
3. The preference of free speech over equality
First Amendment speech and Fourteenth Amendment equality free-
doms are among the most prized of our constitutional rights. Both free
speech and equal protection have served as our commitment to the high
ideals of free expression and of the inherent and equal dignity of all per-
sons. It has never been easy to maintain fidelity to both of these ideals.1 41
The question of the appropriate manner with which to deal with hate
speech split this debate wide open, revealing a clear fault-line in this im-
portant but complex connection.1 42
R.A.V., dealing with racially motivated hate speech, illustrates the
split. Juxtaposed against the low First Amendment value in fighting
words was the governmental interest in assuring equality in basic human
rights. Conventionally, a narrowly tailored governmental action in fur-
therance of such a compelling interest should justify limited curtailment
of even certain First Amendment rights.1 4 3 This approach, however, was
unsatisfactory to the Court in R.A. V. As a result, the Court heightened its
review of the St. Paul ordinance by requiring that the restriction be "nec-
essary" because no less restrictive alternative was available.144 In practical
application, this means that the governmental goal must be virtually im-
possible to accomplish without content discrimination. In this way, the
Court resolved the debate between hate speech and equality by preferring
141. Massey, supra note 2, at 104. Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501, 512-15 (1991), describes
the history of the connection between First Amendment speech protections and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection guarantees. He notes that in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980), the Court transformed an equal protection principle "into one about the govern-
ment's power to regulate the content of speech in a public forum, and from this to a more
general First Amendment statement about the government's power to regulate the content
of speech." Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 513. Despite Justice Kennedy's misgivings,
these equal protection dimensions to First Amendment law seem well-accepted today.
142. See Massey, supra note 2, at 115 (discussing the importance of considering the
arguments for suppressing hate speech in relation to the paradigms underlying free
expression).
143. See, e.g. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 643 (1984) (holding that
government may restrict First Amendment right to association if its interest is compelling
and cannot be achieved through significantly less restrictive measures); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (stating that government's "fundamental, overriding
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on [a college's] exercise of [its] religious be-
liefs"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (stating that "only a compelling state
interest [can] justify limiting First Amendment freedoms"). On the other hand, the ration-
ale of Roberts depends on equality being viewed as a compelling interest unrelated to sup-
pression of speech. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. Thus, this rationale better fits the Court's
discussion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), as compared to R.A.V. For a
further discussion of this issue, see infra part V.
144. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
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the right to freedom of speech.145
More than anything else, this debate between free speech and equal-
ity concerns the fundamental organizing principles in our society. While
both guarantees are fundamental, R.A. V. dramatically reinforces the pre-
cept that freedom of expression is the dominant organizing principle in
our society. Moreover, R.A.V. confirms the historical grounding of the
First Amendment on individualist, libertarian roots, rather than egalita-
rian ones. 146 As illustrated by R.A.V., high prices and pains are borne in
maintaining this commitment to free expression. In fact, one might rea-
sonably question the worth of a commitment when the price requires
families to endure race-based threats in the privacy of their homes. Logi-
cally, such a preference for freedom of speech is justifiable only if free
expression is truly of such great value.1
47
B. R.A.V.'s Potential for Pitfall in First Amendment Law
Notwithstanding R.A.V.'s potential for progress in First Amendment
law, it also presents substantial potential for pitfall. The concurring Jus-
tices latched onto three such "pitfalls." First, the Court's revision of its
categorical approach in determining the line between protected and un-
protected speech risks arbitrary decisionmaking in defining the boundary
of the First Amendment. 148 Second, the Court's absolutism in the prohibi-
tion of content-based regulation of speech severely contorts settled First
Amendment law and threatens serious dilution in the level of protection
accorded different areas of speech. 49 Third, the Court's absolutist, all-or-
nothing approach to content discrimination also levels the treatment of
qualitatively different harms posed by the speech. 50 Each of these risks
presents serious threat to the First Amendment unless careful judgment
is applied in resolving future First Amendment cases.
1. Refining the categorical approach risks arbitrary decisionmak-
ing in ascertaining the boundary between protected and unprotected
speech
Certainly the Court made a worthy contribution to First Amendment
law by narrowing the categorical approach used to determine the line be-
tween protected and unprotected speech. However, R.A.V.
145. Id. at 2550.
146. Certainly R.A.V. demonstrates that the Court has rejected the egalitarian view
that the First Amendment should be limited in service of equality interests, like preventing
hate speech directed against minority groups. This may be because "[e]fforts to establish
pluralism will always shade, at one point or another, into [cultural authoritarianism]." Rob-
ert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First
Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297, 314 (1988) [hereinafter Post, Cultural Heterogeneity].
147. For a discussion of whether the benefits of free speech outweigh the associated
costs, see infra part V.
148. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2564 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. Id. 2556 (White, J., concurring).
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obscures the line between speech that could be regulated freely on the
basis of content ([e.g.,j the narrow categories of expression falling
outside the First Amendment) and that which could be regulated on
the basis of content only upon a showing of a compelling state interest
([e.g.,] all remaining expression).151
By obscuring this line, the Court created a risk of arbitrary and erroneous
decisionmaking with respect to ascertaining the boundary of the First
Amendment. What was once a clear and determinate boundary has been
rendered somewhat indefinite. Consequently, judges and other deci-
sionmakers will proceed with less certainty when rendering judgments
concerning the outer boundary of protected speech. Obviously, this
presents a danger of the erroneous proscription of protected expression,
thereby weakening First Amendment guarantees.
Notwithstanding these dangers, the risks do appear to be quite con-
tainable. 152 Under R.A.V.'s version of the categorical approach, deci-
sionmakers may no longer wholly restrict proscribed categories, but must,
instead, review proscribed categories for the presence of content discrimi-
nation. It is possible that other First Amendment radiations such as prior
restraint, chilling effect or vagueness, may apply to the R.A.V. analysis as
well."'3 The R.A.V. inquiry is still a principled and focused means for de-
termining the line between protected and unprotected expression. Clear,
objective, and easily identifiable traits exist upon which to focus and ap-
ply the doctrine: those First Amendment radiations already identified by
the Supreme Court.
The teachability and transferability of this new regime of unpro-
tected speech is readily apparent. The Court, as it has in past revisions of
the categorical approach, can supervise a case-by-case refinement of
boundaries that are not clearly defined.154 In sum, a limited presumptive
151. Id. (White, J., concurring).
152. R.A.V. revised the categorical approach to First Amendment protection, but it
did not abandon this approach. The continued existence of a categorical approach will help
maintain a clear distinction between protected and unprotected speech.
153. For a discussion of how R.A.V. might apply to the First Amendment, see supra
notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
154. For example, consider the Court's prior reconceptualization of the fighting words
doctrine. Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fight-
ing words as words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme-
diate breach of the peace") (emphasis added) with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20(1971) (redefining fighting words to allow government to punish such speech only if it cre-
ated an immediate threat of retaliatory violence by person to whom it is directed). Cohen
helped restore the original ruling of Chaplinsky. The Court's actual holding in Chaplinsky
was that New Hampshire's interest in preserving public peace was justified by prohibiting
"words likely to cause an average addressee to fight." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. Chaplin-
sky emphasized that the statute's purpose "was to preserve the public peace, no words being
forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed." Id. Thus, the "inflict injury" prong was actu-
ally dictum never subsequently followed up by the Court.
Nevertheless, despite the Court's excision of the "inflict injury" prong and its further
narrowing of the fighting words doctrine, lower federal courts and state courts still persisted
in sustaining convictions under prior definitions of fighting words, often sanctioning obvi-
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categorical approach still has an important role to play in First Amend-
ment law-a role which the Court can readily monitor.
2. The Court's new absolutism in the prohibition of content-based
regulation severely contorts the fabric of settled First Amendment law
and threatens an unraveling of the amendment
The Court announced its new prohibition of content regulation by
concluding that it was unconstitutional for St. Paul to proscribe only po-
litically incorrect fighting words rather than the broader category of all
fighting words. 155 Presumably, had the city proscribed all fighting words
(as the Court implied it should have), the ordinance would have passed
scrutiny. To the concurring Justices, the majority's approach translated
into an "all-or-nothing" approach that prohibits underinclusive regula-
tion of proscribable categories of speech. 156
The majority rejected the concurring Justices' characterization of its
opinion as imposing this "underinclusiveness" limitation.' 5' According to
the majority, the deficiency in the St. Paul ordinance was its content dis-
crimination, rather than any underinclusiveness.5 8 To prove its point, the
Court asserted that governments could constitutionally regulate some,
but not all, aspects of speech within a proscribable category.15 9 For exam-
ple, "[t]here is no problem whatever . . . with a State's prohibiting ob-
scenity (and other forms of proscribable expression) only in certain media
or markets, for although that prohibition would be 'underinclusive,' it
would not discriminate on the basis of content."' 6 0
This confusion in the Court's newly developed doctrine is serious.
Without elaboration, the transferability and teachability of the doctrine
to judges, prosecutors, or other decisionmakers is heavily laden with risks.
ously protected speech in the process. See, e.g., Fenton v. Spear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa.
1976) (upholding student's suspension from high school for commenting in teacher's pres-
ence, "He's a prick," which were considered unprotected fighting words); People v. Smith,
262 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (reversing conviction of defendant for making ob-
scene gesture and mouthing words believed obscene by police arresting him). Gard, supra
note 137, at 564-80 (discussing judicial protection for unseemly insults). The Court, how-
ever, has never wavered in its narrowing of fighting words, consistently overruling these
aberrant applications of the doctrine. See, e.g., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974)
(reversing conviction of petitioner because words spoken, "chicken shit," not directed at
anyone); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (reversing conviction of anti-war
demonstrator for statement, "We'll take the fucking street later (or again)" because not
directed personally at sheriff, who was offended by language).
155. R.A.V., at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
156. Justice White observed that "[s]hould the government want to criminalize certain
fighting words, the Court now requires it to criminalize all fighting words." Id. (White, J.,
concurring). He concluded that "[s]uch a simplistic, all-or-nothing approach to First
Amendment protection is at odds with common sense and our jurisprudence as well." Id.
White, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 2545.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2545-46.
160. Id. at 2545.
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Furthermore, the confusion may represent grave danger to the fabric of
settled First Amendment law.161 The following material considers the
consequences of such absolutism in content regulation.
At first glance, this all-or-nothing approach appears to be "a general
renunciation of strict scrutiny review, a fundamental tool of First Amend-
ment analysis."16 2 As previously explained, the Court in R.A.V. height-
ened its traditional level of scrutiny to invalidate a viewpoint
discriminatory ordinance. Arguably, such heightened scrutiny is justified
in situations of viewpoint discrimination. 6 3 This explanation, however, is
not apparent from the Court's revision of its doctrinal framework.
For example, contrast the result in R.A.V. with that of Burson v.
Freeman,16 4 a case decided one month before R.A.V. In Burson, a Ten-
nessee statute prohibited the solicitation of votes and the display or dis-
tribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a
polling place.16 5 The statute discriminated by content in selectively pro-
scribing only political speech, leaving other forms of speech un-
restricted.1 66 The Burson Court held that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard in such cases of content discrimination, and thus
applied a traditional strict review to the distinction made between types
of speech. 8 7 The Court ultimately sustained the prohibition because the
state's action was narrowly tailored in service of the compelling interests
of preventing voter intimidation and election fraud."6 " The Burson plural-
ity, however, "squarely rejected the proposition that the legislation failed
First Amendment review because it could have been drafted in a broader,
content-neutral alternative."'6 9
The Court's rejection of a heightened strict scrutiny in Burson ap-
pears to be in direct conflict with the decision in R.A.V., a rather inex-
plicable phenomenon given the fact that the decisions were made only
one month apart. If R.A.V. was merely a case of content discrimination,
the ordinance should reasonably have been upheld under the rationale of
Burson. To invalidate St. Paul's ordinance, the R.A.V. Court thus had to
161. Justice Scalia's opinion is certainly ingenious, but it may also be "mischievous at
best and will surely confuse the lower courts." Id. at 2560 (White, J., concurring). Thus,
Justice White joined the judgment "but not the folly of the opinion." Id. (White, J.,
concurring).
162. Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
163. For a discussion of the justifications for heightened scrutiny in cases involving
viewpoint discrimination, see infra parts IV and V.
164. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (plurality).
165. Id. at 1857-58.
166. Id. at 1850.
167. "In Burson, seven of the eight participating members of the Court agreed that
the strict scrutiny standard applied in a case involving a First Amendment challenge to a
content-based statute." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2554-55 (White, J., concurring). Ironically, Jus-
tice Scalia was the only participating member of the Court not to settle on strict scrutiny as
the standard applicable to such content regulation. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1859 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
168. Burson, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1858 (1992).
169. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2555 (White, J., concurring).
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heighten the level of scrutiny beyond the traditional strict scrutiny ap-
plied in Burson. The R.A.V. Court had to add the requirement that no
content neutral alternative to the content discrimination exists, the very
doctrine rejected in Burson.1" 0
Unfortunately, the Court offered no satisfactory explanation for dis-
tinguishing R.A.V. from Burson. Rather, its reasoning appears an "arid,
doctrinaire interpretation"' of First Amendment doctrine, disconnected
in certain respects from that body of law in order to achieve desired re-
sults.1 7 2 Under this reasoning, R.A.V. lacks inherent persuasiveness.
Consider the perverse results that arise from the Court's doctrine.
Fighting words, a hitherto unprotected category of speech, is now ac-
corded the same level of protection as core speech because, under R.A.V.,
selective regulaton of fighting words is subjected to especially heightened
scrutiny. Indeed, as the comparison between Burson and R.A.V. reveals,
to the extent the Court applies its most exacting scrutiny only to content
discrimination within proscribable categories, it grants greater First
Amendment protection to these "unprotected" areas of speech than cer-
tain forms of core speech.
The level of protection the Court now accords fighting words is also
higher than that it accords to commercial speech, a category of expression
normally given intermediate or second-level protection. 73 Current inter-
pretations of commercial speech allow governments to regulate selectively
certain problems without regulating all similar problems. For example, in
Morales v. TWA," 4 the Court allowed Congress to prohibit false advertis-
ing directed at airline passengers without also prohibiting false advertis-
ing directed at bus passengers. Similarly, in Lehman v. Shaker Heights' 5
the Court allowed a city to prohibit political advertisements in its buses
while allowing commercial and public service advertising. Also consider
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co."76 and Rust v. Sulli-
van,177 where the Court shockingly sanctioned the very official censorship
of ideas it so shrilly condemned in R.A.V. In Posadas, the Court sus-
tained a Puerto Rico statute forbidding advertisements of casino gam-
bling directed at Puerto Rican nationals, even though casino gambling
170. Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring). With such a revised doctrine in place, St. Paul
could meet the Court's objections only by either proscribing all fighting words (the content-
neutral alternative) or not legislating at all.
171. Id. at 2560 (White, J., concurring).
172. Justice White remarked, "[tloday, the Court has disregarded two established
principles of First Amendment law [fighting words and strict scrutiny analysis] without pro-
viding a coherent replacement theory." Id. (White, J., concurring).
173. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (stating four-part intermediate scrutiny test applicable to commercial
speech).
174. 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
175. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality). Interestingly, Lehman was decided prior to the
Court's protection of commercial speech in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Councils, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
176. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
177. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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was legal in Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico widely advertised the activity
outside the commonwealth.17 1 In Rust, the Court sustained a regulatory
order that forbade doctors and other health professionals in federally fi-
nanced facilities from discussing abortion with their patients.179
Something is seriously amiss in First Amendment law if content or
viewpoint discrimination is permitted in some areas, such as false airline
advertising, political advertising, casino gambling, and abortion counsel-
ing, but not in others, such as hate speech. This paradox is inexplicable
on any basis other than the announcement of a new doctrinal tool of First
Amendment law: While content discrimination on the basis of subject
matter is presumptively unconstitutional, viewpoint discrimination is
even more highly disfavored and is thus subject to even greater
scrutiny.180
Unless R.A. V. announced a new doctrine of First Amendment law,
the Court's decision in that case "turns First Amendment law on its
head."' " It disturbs the settled fabric of First Amendment jurisprudence
because the content of speech serves as a basis for distinctions at every
level of First Amendment law. The high level of protection accorded core
political, religious, and artistic speech, for example, depends on distin-
guishing these categories of speech from other, lesser valued categories,
such as commercial and offensive speech, which receive an intermediate
level of protection. 18' Likewise, whether speech falls within one of the
narrow categories of "unprotected" expression, such as fighting words or
obscenity, depends on the content of the speech. In short, content deter-
mines the level of protection accorded speech within the rough hierarchy
of speech established by the Court.
Ultimately, the Court's revisionism in R.A.V. threatens doctrinal di-
lution. "By placing fighting words, which the Court has long held to be
valueless, on at least equal constitutional footing with political discourse
and other forms of speech that [have been] deemed to have the greatest
social value, [R.A.V. threatens to] devalue[ ] the latter category.' 8 3 The
risk is that the Court will weaken the traditionally strong protection ac-
corded core speech to the level of lower valued fighting words if it is una-
ble to differentiate between levels of protection based on content. 84 This
178. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348.
179. Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. Obviously, there is a need for the Court to apply its princi-
ples consistently. Posadas and Rust are both patently inconsistent with R.A.V.
180. For a discussion of how the new doctrine explains R.A.V., see infra part IV.
181. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. It is important to "distinguish lesser speech from core speech and thereby guard
against the danger of doctrinal dilution." Eberle, Commercial Speech Paradigm, supra note
65, at 459 (citing Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 290-96 (1981)). Such categorization should only "be done ...
with significant justification and only in the face of reasonably reliable objective determi-
nants. . . . [and] only when the category of speech thereby created 'is capable of principled
definition and application.'" Id. (quoting Schauer, supra at 296).
183. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("If we are forbidden from categorizing, as
the Court has done here, we shall reduce protection across the board."). Id.
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dilution of protection will likely weaken the First Amendment to its low-
est common denominator.'85
The R.A.V. majority seemed to recognize these tendencies in its doc-
trine and, therefore, qualified its prohibition on content-based regulations
by "quickly offering some ad hoc limitations.'18 6 Ironically, the majority
thus demonstrated the limitations of an absolute categorical rules-based
approach to the First Amendment. 7 Little can be expected from a new
rule of law that must be qualified by numerous exceptions, some of which
"swallow" the rule and most of which fail under scrutiny, in order for the
rule to apply sensibly to the complexity of First Amendment
jurisprudence.""'
185. "If all expressive activity must be accorded the same protection, that protection
will be scant." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 2565 (Stevens, J., concurring). Within proscribable categories, content dis-
crimination can occur when it "consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech
at issue is proscribable," or when the object of the discrimination is to control "particular
'secondary effects' of the speech," or when a "content-based subcategory of... speech [is]
swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech."
Id. at 2545-46. For a further discussion of the limitations of R.A.V., set by the majority
opinion, see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
187. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion,
has been described as "favor[ing] operative rules and condemn[ing] operative standards...
more than any other current Justice." Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991
Term, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 83 (1992).
Professor Sullivan also notes that in R.A.V. Justice Scalia "found rules at the level of opera-
tive constitutional doctrine derived from precedent; namely, a rule of content-neutrality."
Id. at 82.
188. For example, consider the Court's first exception to its rule prohibiting content-
discrimination: "[W]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or
viewpoint discrimination exists." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545. To illustrate:
[T]he Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that
are directed against the President ... since the reasons why threats of violence
are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of vio-
lence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of
the President.
Id. at 2546. However, as Justice White points out, this "exception swallows the majority's
rule." Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring). Further, according to Justice Stevens,
[p]recisely this same reasoning . . . compels the conclusion that St. Paul's ordi-
nance is constitutional. Just as Congress may determine that threats against the
President entail more severe consequences than other threats, so St. Paul's City
Council may determine that threats based on the target's race, religion, or gen-
der cause more severe harm to both the target and to society than other threats.
This latter judgment-that harms caused by racial, religious, and gender-based
invective are qualitatively different from that caused by other fighting
words-seems to me eminently reasonable and realistic.
Id. at 2565 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Court's second exception also falls apart under scrutiny. This exception, one of
"secondary effects" analysis, has been severely criticized for transforming content-selective
regulations into content-neutral regulations. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-38 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of "secondary effects," see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
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Ultimately, the Court seems to have skewed its analysis out of com-
mitment to absolute "rules" of law or, even worse, "its temptation to de-
cide the issue over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity.' "189
Ironically, the Court could have decided R.A.V. without such doctrinal
upheaval by relying simply on the firmly embedded First Amendment
principle that government may not censor the expression of an idea, no
matter how disagreeable that idea may be. 9 ° If the majority had elabo-
rated on the difference between viewpoint and subject matter discrimina-
tion as two different forms of content-based discrimination and explained
that it is the former which triggers a heightened strict scrutiny approach,
R.A.V. would have been a far more coherent case. 1
9 1
3. The Court's "all-or-nothing" approach to content discrimina-
tion also levels the treatment of qualitatively different harms, threaten-
ing its own disruption of First Amendment law
Another byproduct of R.A.V. is that the Court's absolutism in
prohibiting content-based regulation levels the treatment of qualitatively
different harms. For example, St. Paul's ordinance was predicated on its
view that harms based on race, creed, or gender "are more pressing public
concerns than the harms caused by other fighting words."' 2 That is an
eminently reasonable finding "[i]n light of our Nation's long and painful
experience with discrimination" and the dramatic rise in the level of hate
crimes.193 Indeed, the Court conceded in Wisconsin v. Mitchell'e' that
bias-inspired conduct inflicts greater individual and societal harm than
other harmful conduct. 9 5
However, under the R.A.V. majority's approach to content-regula-
tion, St. Paul could not proscribe racial invective unless it regulated all
other fighting words as well. 96 Thus, governments are forced to regulate
lesser dangers in the same manner they regulate greater dangers, if they
desire to restrict these greater dangers. This result defies common sense.
It also seems to defy conventional First Amendment doctrine, which al-
In short, the Court's new regime does not hold up under close examination. Worse, the
regime presents a serious risk to the First Amendment, both threatening to unravel its
structure and to dilute its protection of highly valued speech. Careful reasoning and sound
judgment is necessary to contain these risks.
189. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 2542.
191. For a further discussion of how an elaboration of the "viewpoint?' and "subject
matter" dichotomy of content discrimination would lead to a clarified reading of R.A.V., see
infra part VI.
192. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
193. Id. For a discussion of hate crime and its increasing frequency, see supra note 19
and accompanying text.
194. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
195. Id. at 2201. The treatment of bias-inspired conduct as conduct and not speech
explains the difference in the Court's approval of the Wisconsin law in Mitchell and its
invalidation of the St. Paul ordinance in R.A.V. For a further discussion of this application,
see infra part V.C.
196. See R.A.V.. 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
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lows a government to regulate only those problems that exist, and does
not force governments to regulate problems not yet in existence. 197
Treatment of harm is part of the accommodation forged between
freedom of expression and legitimate governmental interests. The com-
plexity of social reality reflects differences in quality and force among
harms. Modern First Amendment jurisprudence has accounted for these
differences by adjusting the level of protection accorded speech in rela-
tion to the harm presented. Consider, for example, the evolution of the
"clear and present" danger standard. When first created, the standard
allowed broad restrictions on the advocacy of ideas. 98 Later, the Court
narrowed the standard to allow government restriction only of advocacy
of unlawful action or violence imminently likely to occur. s19 Upon scru-
tiny, the Court found that only the latter circumstance presents a serious
enough harm to justify curtailment of speech since it threatens an imme-
diate rupture of the social fabric.
The whole structure of First Amendment law is based on this process
of accommodation between the value of speech and the quality of harm
which speech may produce. In this process of accommodation, qualita-
tively weaker harms have been winnowed out from the equation, overrid-
den by free speech values.200 Left remaining are only serious, concrete,
"clear and present" dangers that by necessity justify limited restrictions
on freedom of speech.
This dynamic applies to all categories of expression, including pros-
cribable categories. Within each category, there exists a myriad of harms,
some of which are greater than others. For example, within the proscrib-
able category of threats, a threat to the life of the President reasonably is
a greater social harm than a threat to an average citizen. While the Presi-
dent's death would greatly disrupt the nation,20 1 it is doubtful that the
death of an average citizen would have such an effect.
197. Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1856 (1992). The Court has observed that
[t]he problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doc-
trinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one
phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
198. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress has a right to prevent."). Under this broad theory, a person could be convicted for
advocating a boycott of the World War I draft.
199. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)
("[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech ... do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.").
200. See, e.g., id. at 447-48.
201. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
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Under the Court's revised doctrine, however, seemingly all harms
within a given category should be treated equally. This forces govern-
ments to treat serious problems the same as lessor problems and
problems that may not yet even exist.20 2 Such absolutism plants the seeds
of its own doctrinal dilution, shackling governments to treat dissimilar
harms in similar ways. In such a regime, governments will be tempted to
regulate either broadly or narrowly to avoid condemnation by the courts.
If governments regulate broadly, they will proscribe wide areas of social
reality. Entire categories may be proscribed and the effect will most likely
restrict protected as well as unprotected activities. In such a situation,
the Court would have to be especially vigilant to prevent censorship.
However, if governments regulate too narrowly, harms are likely to go
unregulated.
For example, consider the problem of fraud or overreaching arising
from in-person solicitation by professionals, a form of commercial speech.
If governments want to deal with this problem in the legal profession,
must they now regulate broadly or narrowly the same problem in all pro-
fessions? In the legal profession, in-person solicitation is presumptively
illegal in circumstances "conducive to overreaching and other forms of
misconduct. 20 3 But in the accounting profession, the Court has recently
declared that such solicitation is legal.20 4 The difference, according to the
Court, lies in the qualitatively different assessment of the harms.205 Legal
in-person solicitation is thought to present special harms of coercion and
overreaching because lawyers are "professional[ly] trained in the art of
persuasion ' 2°8 and some of their clients are unsophisticated and thereby
more subject to manipulation or overreaching. In-person solicitation by
accountants, however, presents minimal harms because accountants are
not advocates, and their clients are presumed to be sophisticated business
people.20 7 Under the Court's new doctrine in R.A.V., however, we are
faced with the question of whether a government must regulate both pro-
fessions in the same manner: Either raise legal solicitation to the higher
constitutional level of accounting solicitation, or lower accounting solici-
tation to the lower constitutional level of legal solicitation. The "harms"
presented by each situation are qualitatively different, and any attempt
to treat them equally creates a rule which ill serves the particular prob-
lem. Under either approach, an illogical reduction or expansion of consti-
tutional protection would result.
R.A. V. illustrates this tension as well. Racial invective is an especially
serious form of verbal assault, and it is important to understand the harm
202. Contra Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1856 (1992) ("States adopt laws to
address the problems that confront them. The First Amendment does not require states to
regulate for problems that do not exist.").
203. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 441, 464 (1978).
204. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1797 (1993).
205. Id. at 1802.
206. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465-66.
207. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1802-03.
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caused by such racial hate speech. 208 First, racial invective reinforces the
sense of inferiority and subordination held by historically discrete and
insular minorities. Victims targeted by such assaults may naturally expe-
rience "spirit murder,"2 hatred or self-hatred, a sense of worthlessness,
or other effects of such speech.210 Second, it disseminates messages of ra-
cial or ethnic superiority, an idea with noxious and frightful consequences
in the twentieth century.2 1  Third, it conveys messages of exclusivity and
rejection from majoritarian or other favored communities, reinforcing the
sense of isolation and alienation often felt by victims. 21 2 In sum, racial
invective is a more harmful member of the fighting words category than
others of the species.213
But R.A. V. illustrates the other part of the tension as well: how best
to prevent such harm in a manner consistent with the First Amendment
rights of the speaker. In R.A.V. and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the chosen
remedy was reliance on conventional First Amendment principles of pun-
ishing conduct, not speech, and fighting offensive speech with counter
208. Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech, supra note 132, at 459-60.
209. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129, 151 (1987).
210. Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech, supra note 132, at 452-57. Lawrence ob-
served that
[riacial epithets and harassment often cause deep emotional scarring, and feel-
ings of anxiety and fear that pervade every aspect of a victim's life. Many vic-
tims of hate propaganda have experienced physiological and emotional
symptoms ranging from rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, to night-
mares, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis and suicide.
Id. at 462. Accord, Matusda, supra note 12, at 2332-36.
211. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 273 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech].
212. Id.
213. In fact, on this rationale it may be possible to regulate racist expression by limit-
ing the class of communications subject to sanction to those that adversely affect specified
individuals. The nature of the harm might vary, depending on the injury addressed. If the
focus was on preventing dignitary harms, the injury might arise from the communication
itself. However, this approach would be problematic in light of the Court's reconception of
public defamation. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A second
focus might be on emotional damage, for which independent proof of distress should be
required. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 211, at 274.
The relevant precedent here is New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), where the
Court unanimously held that a government could suppress non-obscene child pornography.
The Court reasoned that "prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children consti-
tutes a government objective of surpassing importance. . . [and] that the use of children as
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental
health of the child." Id. at 757-58. Applying Ferber, it would make sense to regulate hate
speech when it targets specified individuals with the intent to cause grievous injury and
tangibly causes such injury. See also Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech, supra note 132,
at 481 (arguing that the First Amendment permits the regulation of "face-to-face racial
vilification"); Matsuda, supra note 12, at 2356-61 (advocating that a new categorical excep-
tion be adopted for "racial hate messages"). The Court's treatment of hate speech in light of
its treatment of non-obscene child pornography underscores its extraordinary commitment
to the ideal of unfettered discourse. For further discussion of this commitment, see infra
part V.
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speech and education, rather than excepting such hate speech from free
debate.214 As this article later explains, this result is preferable to an
exemption.
IV. CONTENT NEUTRALITY: THE Two-LEVEL APPROACH TO
CONTENT-REGULATION
In tightening its scrutiny of the St. Paul ordinance, the Court forced
recognition of a two-level approach to content regulation. This bifurca-
tion of content regulation has been implicit in the Court's jurisprudence
for some time, 15 but has been imprecisely and inartfully articulated.
Whatever the prior confusion in the law, R.A.V. forced explicit recogni-
tion of a second and heightened standard applicable to content discrimi-
nation based on viewpoint.
Under a traditional approach, the content discrimination present in
R.A.V. should have triggered application of conventional strict judicial
scrutiny, an inquiry requiring a government to justify its regulation as
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest . . that . . . is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. ' '216 The St. Paul ordinance should reasonably
have survived this traditional standard since its content regulation was
arguably narrowly drawn and served the compelling governmental end of
ensuring equality among all the citizens in St. Paul.21 7
To invalidate St. Paul's ordinance, the Court had to heighten the
level of scrutiny. The Court first probed the subject selectivity of the or-
dinance and concluded that such selectivity disguised actual censor-
ship.218 Having discovered that official censorship was the motive lurking
behind the city's selectivity, the Court then required the city to justify its
use of such content discrimination under the more exacting standard that
it be "necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest."2'" Under
this requirement, "[t]he existence of adequate content-neutral alterna-
tives. . . 'undercut[s] significantly' any defense of such a statute. '220 The
availability of alternatives would make it appear that the government's
214. For an explanation of why it is preferable for a government to focus its efforts on
punishing hate "conduct" and not hate "speech," see infra parts V-VI.
215. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[W]e have implicitly distin-
guished between restrictions on expression based on subject matter and restrictions based
on viewpoint, indicating that the latter are particularly pernicious."). See, e.g., Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-70 (1976) (plurality) (stating that subject
matter restrictions should be tested by less rigorous standard than other content-based
restrictions).
216. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
217. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 ("We do not doubt that these interests are compelling,
and that the ordinance can be said to promote them.").
218. Id. ("Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to
handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility would alone be enough to
render the ordinance presumptively invalid, but St. Paul's comments and concessions in this
case elevate the possibility to a certainty.").
219. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 2550 (citations omitted).
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asserted justification is pretextual, and that its true intent is to regulate
expression based on the speaker's viewpoint.221 Because less restrictive
means of controlling hate speech were available to the city of St. Paul in
R.A. V.,22 2 the Supreme Court found that "the only interest distinctively
served by the content limitation [was] that of displaying the city council's
special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out. '223 The
Court concluded that such a limitation was clearly viewpoint based,224
and so invalidated the ordinance.
R.A.V. thus demonstrates that the Court has recognized a two-level
approach to content regulation. Such regulation consists of either subject
matter or viewpoint discrimination. Subject matter discrimination is jus-
tifiable only upon satisfaction of the traditional strict scrutiny analysis
used in Burson v. Freeman.225 Viewpoint discrimination, however, is justi-
fiable only upon satisfaction of strict scrutiny analysis plus the added re-
quirement that the act be "reasonably necessary" to serve the compelling
end.226 This added component requires that the government use "con-
tent-neutral" means to achieve its compelling interest if such means are
available. Only if such means do not exist may a government engage in
viewpoint discrimination.227
Application of this two level approach to content regulation thus ex-
plains R.A.V. and the Court's approach to content distinction generally.
It lends precision and coherence to a hitherto confusing aspect of First
Amendment law. In the past, the confusion arose from the Court's over-
stated language, which sometimes incorrectly suggested that content reg-
ulation was unconstitutional per se.22s Further confusion arose when,
despite the presence of this language, the Court nevertheless sustained
governmental actions involving viewpoint discrimination.22 9
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the subject matter/viewpoint
distinction in content-based discrimination has eluded courts and com-
221. Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)). The standard derives prin-
cipally from Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (plurality) and Boos. However, only
in R.A.V. did a majority of the Court apply the standard to invalidate state action which
concededly would pass a traditional strict scrutiny analysis. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
222. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2547.
225. For a further discussion of traditional strict scrutiny, see supra notes 167-69 and
accompanying text.
226. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
227. Id. Stated otherwise, content discrimination is almost always unnecessary to ac-
complish a compelling governmental end. Massey, supra note 2, at 184.
228. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("But, above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). Id.
229. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality) (sustaining city ordinances dis-
criminating on the basis of pornographic content). For elaboration of these points, see
Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68
GEO. L.J. 727, 727-28 (1980) [hereinafter Farber, Content Regulation].
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mentators alike. This distinction, however, is a very important one, as
R.A.V. illustrates. Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest
form. 23 0 It censors expression based on particular ideas, views, or opin-
ions, officially favoring or disfavoring specified messages. It thereby im-
pedes the free exchange of ideas, skewing such an exchange in a way that
subject matter discrimination cannot.
Governmental distortion of the free exchange of ideas is, quite
clearly, contrary to the essence of the First Amendment.23' Official inter-
vention in the marketplace of ideas violates the foundational principles of
self-government and self-determination, thus restricting our collective
right to determine for ourselves the truth of an idea. Moreover, when a
government paternalistically determines an idea's worth, it stunts our
own intellectual, moral, and social development by depriving us of the
autonomy to pick and choose, test and refine, and implement and learn
from ideas. 23 2 This in turn undercuts other core First Amendment values
such as autonomy, dignity, and self-realization.2 3 For these reasons, view-
point discrimination can properly be justifiable upon only "the most ex-
acting scrutiny.'
'23 4
Of course, subject matter discrimination may also constitute censor-
ship. Subject matter discrimination blocks off entire subjects and catego-
ries of ideas from discussion, leaving the government as the sole entity
which may decide which sets of ideas are worthy of expression. Thus, it
also impedes the free exchange of ideas. For this reason, the Court prop-
erly presumes that subject matter discrimination is unconstitutional. In-
deed, on this basis, the R.A.V. Court invalidated the ordinance because it
perceived the city's subject selectivity as disguising just such censor-
ship. 2 35 In R.A.V., the Court gave notice that it was not at all interested
in allowing censorship to occur. 23
230. "Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form .... ." Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
231. For a discussion of the value of freedom of speech and the role it serves in our
society, see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
232. Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 81, 100-04 (1978).
233. For a discussion of these values and their importance to a nonconsequential view
of free speech, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
234. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
235. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542, 2547. Indeed, R.A.V. itself is an elusive case. Certain
statements of the Court suggest that the ordinance's subject selectivity was the basis for
invalidation. See, e.g., id. at 2542 ("We conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitu-
tional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the
speech addresses."). However, a closer probing of the Court's opinion reveals that the sub-
ject selectivity disguised viewpoint discrimination. Thus, viewpoint discrimination or pure
censorship is the actual basis for the Court's decision. See, e.g., id. at 2549 ("[Subject]
[s]electivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the ex-
pression of particular ideas. That would alone be enough to render the ordinance presump-
tively invalid, but St. Paul's comments and concessions in this case elevate the possibility to
a certainty.").
236. This seems to be where Justice Kennedy was headed in arguing that a law aimed
at the content of speech itself was pure censorship and therefore unconstitutional per se,
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However, not all subject matter discrimination necessarily implicates
official censorship of ideas, or prevents contrasting views from competing
equally.237 For example, in Burson v. Freeman,2 "3 the Tennessee statute
did not favor or disfavor any particular political idea or view. Rather, it
proscribed all such ideas "neutrally." No political campaign material
could be displayed within the 100 foot restricted zone surrounding the
polling place, but all such proscribed ideas could be freely disseminated
outside the zone.213 The statute was thus completely viewpoint neutral
and the subject matter limitation allowed the state to promote the com-
pelling interest of assuring free and fair elections.
One should also consider the subject selectivity involved when cer-
tain subjects are "swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute di-
rected at conduct rather than speech. ' 240  For example, sexually
derogatory fighting words in an employment setting may violate Title
VII's prohibition against sexual discrimination in the workplace. 241 How-
ever, despite its subject matter selectivity and an arguable infringement
upon the First Amendment, the reach of Title VII is still constitutional.
This is because Title VII is targeted against the conduct of sexual dis-
crimination. 242 "Where the government does not target conduct on the
basis of its expressive content, [conduct is] not shielded from regulation
merely because [it] express[es] a discriminatory idea or philosophy. '24 3
These examples demonstrate that subject matter discrimination may
be a "functional necessity of contemporary government. '244 There simply
may be no other way to address the problem at hand. Accordingly, while
subject matter discrimination is presumptively, but not invariably, un-
unjustifiable even under a strict scrutiny analysis. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 512-13 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
observed:
The case before us presents the opportunity to adhere to a surer test for con-
tent-based cases and to avoid using an unnecessary formulation [strict scrutiny],
one with the capacity to weaken central protections of the First Amendment. I
would recognize this opportunity to confirm our past holdings and to rule that
the New York statute amounts to raw censorship based on content, censorship
forbidden by the text of the First Amendment and well-settled principles pro-
tecting speech and the press. That ought to end the matter.
Id. at 515. It seems the seeds sown by Justice Kennedy in Simon bore fruit in R.A. V., result-
ing in the two part approach to content regulation advocated here. Under R.A.V., viewpoint
discrimination, or pure censorship, is almost unconstitutional per se under a "strict scrutiny
plus necessity" standard of judicial review. Subject matter discrimination, however, is still
tested under conventional strict scrutiny analysis. Again, this evidences the Court's increas-
ing commitment to the view that free speech is an end in itself.
237. Stone, supra note 232, at 104-06.
238. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
239. Id. at 1848 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b)(1) (Supp. 1994)).
240. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
241. Id.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination
based on an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
243. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
244. Id. at 2570 (Stevens, J. concurring).
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constitutional, 4 5 viewpoint discrimination is almost always unconstitu-
tional. This more precise delineation of the different forms of content
discrimination usefully accounts for the degree of risk of official censor-
ship posed, and provides much needed coherence in the law.
A. Content Discrimination by Subject Matter
Only recently has the Court settled on conventional strict scrutiny as
the appropriate test for measuring instances of subject matter discrimina-
tion. While articulations of strict scrutiny applicable to content discrimi-
nation can be traced to Carey v. Brown,246 clear gauging of subject matter
selectivity by strict scrutiny is evident only in Boos v. Barry247 and Bur-
son v. Freeman.2 s The Court's clear application of the strict scrutiny test
to subject matter discrimination in these cases stands in sharp contrast to
its earlier muddled pronouncements of the doctrine.
Not surprisingly, the standard used to judge content discrimination
has been somewhat of a mystery of recent First Amendment law. The
Court's actual method of analysis often did not measure up to the ur-
gency of its language. For example, despite earlier pronouncements that
"government has no power to restrict expression because of its... sub-
ject matter, or its content, '249 the Court upheld laws selectively regulating
"indecent" language in radio broadcasts, 250 political advertising on
buses, 25 ' and the location of adult movie theaters. 252 Clearly, the Court
failed to put its theory into practice.2 5
3
This lack of clarity in the Court's articulated standards shrouded the
application of the doctrine in a cloak of confusion. For example, in Leh-
man v. Shaker Heights,2 54 the Court applied a rational basis review and
upheld a city ordinance which regulated only political posters on buses,
leaving unregulated other advertising, such as commercial or public ser-
vice messages.255 Also consider Young v. American Mini Theaters.25  In
Young, the Court sustained a Detroit zoning ordinance that prohibited
the establishment of new adult theaters within specified distances of resi-
245. Id. at 2547 n.6.
246. 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
247. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
248. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
249. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
250. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) (plurality).
251. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality).
252. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Young v. Amer-
ican Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality). For a further discussion of these
cases, see Farber, Content Regulation, supra note 229, at 727-28.
253. Farber, supra note 229, at 728.
254. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality).
255. Id. at 304.
256. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality). The analysis of Young later evolved into the "sec-
ondary effects" analysis of Renton, which was discussed by the Court in R.A.V., 112 S. Ct.
at 2549. For further discussion of the "secondary effects" analysis, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
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dential areas or other specified "regulated uses. '25 7 The Court applied
what appeared to be an intermediate form of review even though it recog-
nized that the ordinance distinguished between theaters based on the
content of each theater's speech.
258
Against this inconsistent and muddled backdrop, the Court's recent
and more precise articulations of the test applicable to content discrimi-
nation, and the congruence between the articulated standard and its ap-
plication, stand in sharp and welcome contrast. For example, in Boos v.
Barry the Court stated that "a content-based restriction on political
speech in a public forum .. .must be subjected to the most exacting
scrutiny. 25 9 Thus, the Court has required the State to show that the
"regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. '26 0 With this clarified doctrinal
framework in place, the Boos Court applied the strict scrutiny test to the
law at issue, which prohibited the display of signs within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy, if the sign "tends to bring that foreign government into
'public odium' or 'public disrepute.' 261 After a lengthy analysis, the
Court struck down the law, finding it to be an unconstitutional regulation
of the content of speech not narrowly tailored in service of a sufficiently
compelling interest.2 62 The ready availability of a significantly less restric-
tive alternative, such as federal law prohibiting intimidation, coercion or
harassment of foreign officials, amply demonstrated the lack of a suffi-
ciently tight connection between the means used and the end sought.6 3
Following Boos, the Court easily disposed of the Son of Sam law at
issue in Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board.264 The
New York law required that the income of accused or convicted criminals
derived from work depicting the crime be made available to victims of the
crime. 26 5 In finding the law unconstitutional, the Court found that "[t]he
Son of Sam law establishes a financial disincentive to create or publish
works with particular content.266 The Court conceded that New York had
257. Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73.
258. Id. at 66.
259. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
260. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
261. Id. at 316 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981) (repealed 1988).
262. Id. at 329.
263. The Court pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) to illustrate why the ordinance in
question was unconstitutional. Congress enacted both provisions to protect foreign missions
from "intrusion," "damage," and "disturbance of the peace." Boos, 485 U.S. 322 (citation
omitted). Section 112 prohibits willful acts or attempts to "intimidate, coerce, threaten, or
harass a foreign official ...or obstruct . . . the performance of his duties." § 112(b)(2).
While the Washington ordinance was targeted directly against speech, § 112 was aimed at
any activity including speech that had the prohibited effect. Boos, 485 U.S. at 326. This
difference illustrated that Congress had available "a significantly less restrictive" option
than the Washington ordinance. Id.
264. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
265. Id. at 505 (quoting N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1992) (repealed 1992)).
266. Id. at 509.
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a compelling interest in "compensating victims from the fruits of the
crime, '26 7 but found that the law at issue was not narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.
28
Finally, in Burson the Court found that Tennessee's content-based
subject matter proscription of only political speech within 100 feet of pol-
ling places was justified as a way to promote the compelling governmental
interest of preventing election fraud and voter intimidation. 20 However,
Burson may again demonstrate the need for congruence between the ar-
ticulated and applied standards of strict scrutiny. The Court in Burson
said that it was applying a strict scrutiny standard, but it did not, in
actuality, scrutinize the statute as strictly as it could have. Indeed, it
could have applied a closer look to determine the fit between the ends
and means, and, had it done so, may have found the connection lacking.
First, other types of speech left unrestricted around polling places could
also interfere with voting. For example, commercial or charitable solicita-
tion outside the polling place would seem to pose some of the same po-
tential dangers of distraction as political campaigning. Second, the
restricted zone itself could have been more narrowly drawn. For example,
the Tennessee Supreme Court had reduced the boundary of the zone to
twenty-five feet.27 0 Third, "[s]tates could secure these same compelling
interests with [less restrictive] statutes that make it a misdemeanor to
interfere with an election or to use violence or intimidation to prevent
voting. '2 71 In these respects, the law was both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive. Certainly the state's justifications would have been insufficient
for the more probing scrutiny adopted by R.A.V. for viewpoint
discrimination.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination is More Disfavored than Subject Matter
Discrimination
R.A.V. sharply illustrates the Court's heightening of judicial scrutiny
applicable to viewpoint discrimination. In view of the conceded over-in-
clusiveness and under-inclusiveness of Burson, the ordinance in R.A.V.
certainly would have passed a traditional strict scrutiny test.272 However,
as previously explained, the R.A.V. Court chose to subject the viewpoint
discriminatory ordinance to a "more exacting" standard, which required
that the weapon of content discrimination "be employed only where it is
necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest, 1173 a doctrine re-
267. Id.
268. Id. at 511.
269. Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1858 (1992).
270. Freeman v. Burson, 802 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tenn. 1990). The United States Su-
preme Court believed, however, that "[r]educing the boundary to 25 feet. . . is a difference
only in degree, not a less restrictive alternative in kind." Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1857.
271. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1855.
272. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 2549 (quoting Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1852) (alteration in original)).
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jected in Burson.274 As previously explained, the requirement of "neces-
sity" means that the measure must be the least restrictive alternative for
accomplishing the goal. Ultimately, it seems the governmental goal must
be practically impossible to accomplish without discriminating by
content.
7 5
With this revised doctrinal framework in place, the Court was able to
ferret out St. Paul's censorship, demonstrating how the subject matter
discrimination actually disguised viewpoint discrimination.2 76 The ordi-
nance was aimed at silencing "bias motivated" speech, especially that
"based on virulent notions of racial supremacy."' 2 7 The Court approved
of St. Paul's goal, but refused to allow the city to achieve it through "se-
lective limitations upon speech. '27s Conversely, the lack of any evidence
of actual censorship in Boos and Burson explains why those cases were
dealt with as instances of subject matter, but not viewpoint,
discrimination.
This two-level approach to content regulation makes eminent sense
because viewpoint discrimination is properly more threatening to free
speech values than subject matter discrimination.279 Cox v. Louisiana, a
paradigmatic case of viewpoint discrimination,28 0 demonstrates why this
is so. In Cox, the Court invalidated a statute that specifically permitted
"picketing for the publication of labor union views," while prohibiting
other sorts of picketing.28' Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated
that with this statute,
Louisiana [was] ... attempting to pick and choose among the views it
is willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus [was] trying to pro-
274. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1855.
275. Massey, supra note 2, at 182. Alternatively, it is arguable that R.A.V. restores
strict scrutiny analysis to a properly exacting test by tightening the means component. By
requiring the means to be necessary, the Court properly focuses attention on the least re-
strictive alternative for accomplishing the end. However, this heightened application of
strict scrutiny differs notably from the Court's looser testing of means in Burson. Thus, if
R.A.V. represents a restoration of strict scrutiny, Burson would seem to be a dilution
thereof. This appears somewhat illogical given the very short passage in time (one month)
between the decisions. For a discussion of these two cases and the scrutiny applied in each,
see supra notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
276. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. In its "practical operation," the ordinance involved
"actual viewpoint discrimination." Id. at 2547. "In fact the only interest distinctively served
by the content limitation is that of displaying the city council's special hostility toward the
particular biases thus singled out. That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids." Id.
at 2550.
277. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991).
278. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
279. For a discussion of why viewpoint discrimination is more harmful than subject
matter discrimination, see supra notes 230-45, and accompanying text.
280. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating
Texas statute proscribing flag desecration); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (in-
validating Chicago ordinance exempting labor disputes from general prohibition against
picketing at a school). But see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328
(1986) (upholding prohibition of on-island advertising by Puerto Rican casinos).
281. Cox, 379 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., concurring).
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scribe by law what matters of public interest people whom it allows to
assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This seems. . . to be
censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.2 82
Subject matter discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional because
it interferes with the free exchange of ideas. It allows governments to ma-
nipulate the "marketplace" of ideas by foreclosing certain areas of discus-
sion. For these reasons, subject matter discrimination is properly subject
to conventional strict scrutiny. Viewpoint discrimination, however, is
properly subject to the "strict scrutiny plus necessity" standard. While
subject matter discrimination may foreclose certain areas of speech, view-
point discrimination forecloses only certain opinions within a given area.
It thus skews the free exchange of ideas in a way that subject matter
discrimination alone cannot. By prohibiting only certain points of view,
the government tacitly endorses other opinions. Viewpoint discrimination
is like an artist's chisel, allowing the government to exercise fine control
over what opinions may properly be expressed. Since the government is in
possession of the instrument, it may then decide the ultimate shape ex-
pression may take. Before the government should be allowed to use this
instrument, it should have to demonstrate that such viewpoint discrimi-
nation is the last resort for eschewing a truly compelling interest.
In view of R.A.V.'s extension of such exacting scrutiny to proscribed
categories, it is logical that this heightened scrutiny also should be ap-
plied to viewpoint discrimination in intermediate categories of speech.
Otherwise, quite serious doctrinal dilution is afoot.
Recognition and careful application of this two-level approach to
content discrimination explains more clearly existing case law in this
area. This approach also renders more precise the specific content of the
tests to be applied to instances of content discrimination, in both the sub-
ject matter and viewpoint varieties. First Amendment jurisprudence is
thereby made more precise and more sensible. Judges and other deci-
sionmakers have more guidance to follow when deciding such cases, and
dangers of inaccurate determinations are thereby lessened.
V. PUBLIC DISCOURSE
The Court's commitment to content neutrality complements its over-
all vision in public discourse, where the Court is guided by "the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleas-
antly sharp attacks on government and public officials. '283 Ideas, opin-
ions, or associations should develop autonomously through individuals'
efforts rather than through governmental intervention in the "world of
282. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
283. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). For a discussion of the
Court's commitment to content neutrality, see infra part VI.
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debate about public affairs."28 With the First Amendment shield against
official intervention, people are able to speak freely, to comment, to criti-
cize, or to "invite dispute . . . induce . . . unrest, create dissatisfaction
• * . or even stir people to anger"285 as they wish-on matters of public
concern.
One goal of such open discourse is achievement of a more "capable
citizenry." As conceived by the Court, this goal may be realized through
the development of concerned and active citizens and open-minded, toler-
ant individuals. Another goal is achievement of a more "perfect polity."
This goal may be realized through a more democratic, informed, and
fairer society.286 In public discourse, these ideals seem valuable more as
aspirations than actually attainable goals. Indeed, one might reasonably
question whether all people are sufficiently mature or enlightened to
shrug off debased ideas and perceive the gem of truth or the better an-
gelic qualities of human nature amidst the swirl of public debate.
However questionable the empirical basis for public discourse may
be, the Court, as demonstrated by R.A.V., is nevertheless committed to
open debate. With its companion case of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, R.A.V.
sharply illustrates the Court's increasing separation of speech from con-
duct. The Court separates the two activities by treating speech as a pre-
sumptively protected activity all but immune from regulation, thereby
forcing governments to influence behavior primarily by regulating con-
duct, not speech. Public speech especially has become an end in itself,
jealously guarded by the Court as a greatly protected category. Prior to
ascertaining R.A. V.'s precise fit within First Amendment jurisprudence, it
is necessary to describe briefly the purposes and contours of public
discourse.
A. The Purposes of Public Discourse
As developed by the Court, public discourse entails discussion of all
"ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and opinion" and not
284. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
285. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
286. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 631-32. See also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.
Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992) ("To endure the speech of false ideas or offensive content and then to
counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon
open discourse towards the end of a tolerant citizenry."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
24 (1971). In Cohen, the Court observed:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmen-
tal restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
policy and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise
of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
Id. at 24 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
11791994]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
just government policies, actions, or actors2 8 7 Doctrinally, the concept of
"public" relevant to public discourse ranges well beyond "expression on
public issues" to speech about public persons2 8 and matters "of public
concern."2 89 These aspects of public discourse relate to democratic self-
government.2 90
Also in the concept of public discourse is expression publicly dissemi-
nated on matters of "public or general interest. 2 91 For example, such
speech might concern public celebrities, important social trends, or
problems as yet unrecognized or unregulated by official authorities. 29 2
This aspect of public discourse relates to the building of culture.
However defined, the concept of "public" relevant to public discourse
means, at a minimum, that this speech is independent of governmental or
majoritarian control. 9 Insulated from official intervention, the ideas and
views arising from open discourse can critically interact in the melting
pot of society.2 9 4 Such "interaction takes the form of discussion. '20 The
discussion proceeds "critically," "meaning that what has been said may
be questioned, negated and contradicted.'298
Among the widely divergent cultures and traditions of American soci-
ety, this robust trade in ideas provides an indispensable means by which
all of us speak to or about one another, however civilly, rudely, or pas-
sionately, before deciding what to do, what values to adopt, and what
ends are worth pursuing.297 Public discourse thus forms an important
287. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50-51.
288. "Public persons" includes both public officials and public figures. Public figures
are those who have attracted the public "eye" either by seeking the public's attention or
through their status or achievements. See Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 626.
289. See id. at 626 (discussing the range of topics included in the concept of public
discourse).
290. Id. at 669-72. Professor Post labels those aspects of "public concern" as the
"'normative' conception of public concern." Id. at 669. "'[N ]ormative' conception of public
concern" refers to "matters that ought to be of interest to those who practice the art of
democratic self-government." Id.
291. Id. at 670-72 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (plu-
rality)). Professor Post defines matters of "public or general interest" as matters that actu-
ally interest the public or matters that interest a significantly large portion of the public. Id.
at 672.
292. Id. at 673. Professor Post has described this aspect of public discourse as the
"'descriptive' conception of public concern." Id. at 669.
293. Id. at 626.
294. Id. at 629-30 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
295. ROBERT E. PARK & ERNEST W. BURGESS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOL-
OGY 869 (1921). "In the public, interaction takes the form of discussion. Individuals tend to
act upon one another critically .... Opinions clash and thus modify and moderate one
another." Id. cited in Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 636.
296. ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEALOGY AND TECHNOLOGY: THE ORIGINS,
GRAMMAR, AND FUTURE OF IDEALOGY 98 (1976) quoted in Post, Public Discourse, supra note
2, at 637.
297. See id. at 671 (quoting Hannah Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public,
9 POL. THEORY 327, 343 (1981)). In her article, Pitkin explains that "people determine what
they will collectively do, settle how they will live together, and decide their future" in the
public domain and with the influence of the public. Id.
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connection among us all.29 8 Structurally, the First Amendment provides
the protected forum for this critical dialogue. 9
From an individual's perspective, public discourse presents the op-
portunity to reevaluate and reconstitute one's life. Public discourse "de-
pends upon the continuous possibility of transcending what is taken for
granted." 30 In this sense, public discourse is linked integrally to personal
decision-making and self-realization. It is an indispensable way by which
we become more "capable citizenry" and more fully realized, "perfect"
people.2 0 1
From a broader societal perspective, public discourse provides the
communicative process necessary for the formation of public opinion and
the common will. s0 2 That is, as ideas impact on one another, they modify
or limit one another. Out of this process a common consensus or collective
"self-determination" is achieved.3 0 3 In this sense, public discourse is
rooted in democratic self-government.30 4 Public discourse thus provides
the medium through which democracy determines its purposes.
30 5
These themes have been evident in the Court's earliest decisions on
public discourse, beginning in 1940 with Cantwell v. Connecticut.3 0 In
Cantwell, the Court protected the speech of a Jehovah's Witness who, in
a public area heavily populated by Catholics, played a phonograph record
which attacked religion generally and Catholicism particularly.30 7 This
message was highly offensive to Cantwell's Catholic audience, some of
298. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 634-38.
299. Id. at 638. Professor Habermas would have a government impose upon public
discussion a regulatory structure of an "ideal speech situation," in which speech is "immu-
nized against repression" and "all force" is excluded, "except the force of the better argu-
ment." Id. at 639 (quoting 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 25-
26 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984)). "Within an ideal speech situation, discourse is seen as
functioning as pure communication, as 'removed from contexts of experience and action'
and as consisting entirely of 'bracketed validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or
warnings." Id. (quoting JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 107 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1975)).
300. Id. at 638.
301. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
302. See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 211, at 282 (discussing the need for public
discourse in a democratic society).
303. Id. at 283.
304. See id. at 281-82 (stating that public discourse is a necessary element of a demo-
cratic society). Indeed, it has been argued that "[a] democracy without public opinion is a
contradiction in terms." Id. at 281 (quoting HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE 287-88 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961)).
305. See id. at 278-85 (discussing the role of the First Amendment and public dis-
course in a democratic society). "In protecting public discourse the first amendment [sic]
serves the purposes of democracy .... Id. at 279. Again, we believe or accept an image of
ourselves as independent, autonomous, self-determinative people who are busy constituting
an autonomous self-government. Id. at 326. Public discourse is structured upon these ideals.
Of course, the reality often differs from the ideals.
306. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Ultimately, the Court's vision on public discourse can be
traced as far back as Justice Brandeis' great concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927).
307. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301.
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whom "felt like hitting" or "throw[ing] Cantwell off the street. 3 0 8
Central to the Court's ruling was its belief that the state must be
neutral concerning the content of expression; thus, it must refrain from
enforcing specific norms constitutive of particular communities, such as
the Catholic community in Cantwell.s 9 Terms like "offensive" or "inde-
cent" are inappropriate standards by which to regulate discourse because
they can be determined only by reference to such particular communal
norms.3 10 Enforcement of any chosen norm constitutes a preferencing of
that norm over others.311 In our culturally heterogenous society, govern-
ments must therefore remain neutral concerning such norms31 2 and
should not inhibit or prejudice an individual's ability to persuade
others. 31
3
In America, "rich cultural diversities 3 1 4 exist, all of which vie for
influence and adherents.3 15 "Many types of life, character, opinion and
belief. . . develop unmolested and unobstructed" beneath the shield of
the First Amendment.316 Community beliefs and allegiances are products
of voluntary associations, not ones of official or majoritarian compul-
sion. 17 Therefore, the formation of norms or values should proceed from
the bottom up, through the autonomous self-determination of a free peo-
ple, and not from the top down."" So conceived, governments may not
properly intervene in this competition for influence.3 19 Just as with ideas,
the Court is committed to neutrality in "the marketplace of
communities."320
Animated by these principles, the Court in Cantwell sketched the
realm of public discourse. Constitutional immunity encompasses speech
about public subjects, like "religious faith," "political belief," or subjects
in which "sharp differences arise. '32 These differences may appear "the
rankest error to [one's] neighbor. 3 22 Additionally, they may be expressed
in attempts to win over converts through "resorts to exaggeration," "vili-
308. Id. at 309.
309. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 629-30.
310. See id. at 625-26 (discussing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987), and
the appropriateness of "outrageousness" as a standard for regulating public discourse).
311. Id. at 603.
312. Id.
313. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
314. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (recognizing
the "rich cultural diversity" of America in holding that statute requiring students to salute
flag violated students' First Amendment rights).
315. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 630.
316. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
317. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 630.
318. "[T]he censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Gov-
ernment over the people." 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794) (statement of James Madison).
319. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 630.
320. Id. at 632 (criticizing the premise that neutrality only belongs in the marketplace
of ideas and suggesting that it also applies to the marketplace of communities).
321. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
322. Id.
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fication of men," and even "false statements."32 3 Despite "the probability
of excesses and abuses," the justification for this protected realm of pub-
lic discourse is that, in "our diversified country, these liberties are...
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citi-
zens of democracy.
'324
Contemporary constitutional doctrine delineates more precisely this
presumptively protected realm of public discourse. Notable is the Court's
commitment to the principle of democratic self-governance. 325 To serve
this value, the Court has created a zone of immunity for speech involving
public officials, public figures, or other matters of public interest. In order
to provide "breathing space" for freedom of speech,326 the Court has in-
jected First Amendment principles into traditional state law concerning
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.3 27 By so doing, the Court has freed public discourse from com-
munity norms of civility or decency which might tend to impede the free
exchange of ideas. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, for
example, immunize persons who speak ill of public officials or public
figures from the sanction of tort law insofar as they do not speak with
"actual malice-that is, with knowledge that [the statement] was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."3 28 While central to
tort law, the question of intent has no place in First Amendment law for
purposes of fixing any "boundary between morally acceptable and unac-
ceptable modes of political discussion. 3 29 Instead, intent plays a role only
in "minimizing the chill on legitimate speech," and under the actual mal-
ice standard, allows the speaker to control the legality of his or her
speech.33
0
Likewise, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell3 3' the Court extended First
Amendment principles to protect a speaker's deliberate "vilification of
men" 332 from the inhibitions of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.33 3 Despite the alleged emotional distress suffered by Jerry
Falwell, the well-known Fundamentalist minister, by Hustler magazine's
publishment of an advertisement parody,3 34 the Court held that, as a pub-
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. The self-government rationale was first advanced by Professor Meiklejohn. See
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 64, at 54-57. According to the self-government rationale, if people
are to govern, they must choose; to do so, they must be informed; and to be informed there
must be an absolutely free flow of ideas and information unrestricted by the government or
majoritarian notions of propriety.
326. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
327. Massey, supra note 2, at 120; Post, Racist Speech, supra note 211, at 286.
328. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
329. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 649.
330. Id. at 649.
331. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
332. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
333. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 57.
334. The parody described Falwell's "First Time" as a drunken, incestuous rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse. Id. at 48.
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lic figure, Falwell could not recover damages from the tort without dem-
onstrating proof of actual malice.3 3 5 Damage to personal reputation, hurt
feelings, and emotional harm are pains to be borne in service of the com-
mitment to the ideal of "unfettered public discourse." s36
Yet, Falwell goes even further in delineating the contours of public
discourse. By rejecting "outrageousness" as a category of proscribable ex-
pression, the Court explicitly rejected any governmental role in arbitrat-
ing acceptable norms of community,33 7 a theme presaged in Cantwell33 8
and later in Cohen v. California.3 3 9 In part, the Court's conclusion is
based on the inherent subjectiveness of terms like "outrageousness" or
"offensiveness. '340 Such terms present dangers to First Amendment free-
doms because they allow juries or community representatives to sanction
speech based on personal dislike of particular expression. 341 This can
"cleanse public debate to the point where it is . . . palatable to the most
squeamish among us. '3 42 However, as previously explained, such a cleans-
ing would be detrimental to the free exchange of ideas and the ideals to
which we aspire. Accordingly, the Court has removed such value judg-
ments from jury or community determination.3 43 Instead, courts protect
the communicative structure of speech by focusing jury deliberations on
legal concepts, such as the "actual malice" standard,344 and by narrowly
circumscribing community control of expression.
Echoing Cantwell, the deeper lesson of Falwell is that concepts such
as "outrageousness" or "offensiveness" are inappropriate standards by
which to measure the constitutionality of speech because they can be de-
termined only by reference to "commonly accepted norms of a particular
community.3 s 45 It is true that terms like "outrageous" or "offensive" are
not necessarily subjective, since they may represent the collective judg-
ment of a community.3 48 However, many culturally diverse communities
exist in the United States, and hence there is no one overarching, com-
monly accepted norm or set of norms constituting community. Rather,
335. Id. at 56-57. "The Falwell decision itself displays this radical negativity by immu-
nizing speech contrary to norms of rationality, respect and toleration-the very norms that
justify the creation of our constitutional form of public discourse." Post, Public Discourse,
supra note 2, at 645.
336. Massey, supra note 2, at 120.
337. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55-56.
338. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
339. 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
340. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55. See also Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 632
(finding that "outrageousness" is an inappropriate standard, not because of its inherent sub-
jectiveness, but rather because it allows a single community to enforce its particular cultural
norms).
341. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55.
342. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
343. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 630.
344. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
345. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 632, 647.
346. Id. at 625. "Outrageous behavior is that which violates community values, rather
than merely personal or idiosyncratic preferences." Id.
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norms differ among people and among communities. "One man's vulgar-
ity is another's lyric; '347 and, "one man's amusement teaches another's
doctrine.13 4 Norms or cultural standards "are not themselves fixed and
determinate, but rather are subject to debate. '349 Indeed, norms in late
twentieth century America seem to be "pragmatically indeterminate." 350
Outrageous speech is valuable precisely because it "call[s] community
identity into question ... and thus ... has unique power to focus atten-
tion, to dislocate old assumptions, and to shock its audience into the rec-
ognition of unfamiliar forms of life." '3 51 The First Amendment safeguards
the possibilities of recognizing new truths and making more satisfactory
choices.
By liberating public discussion from the bounds of any particular
community and taking from the government the power to regulate public
discourse to attain some level of civility, the Court has maintained expan-
sive protection for offensive, 352 outrageous,3 53 and insulting speech3 54 spo-
ken as part of public discourse. It has therefore become impossible to
insulate individuals from exposure to and affront from unimpeded public
debate.3 55 Ultimately, we as free and independent citizens, must deter-
mine the course of public discourse. Freedom to speak one's mind is basic
to being American.
The implication of this perspective is that within public discourse
government must increasingly view speech as independent of action.358
Constitutional doctrine requires governments to maintain a stance of
strict neutrality toward the content of speech. Additionally, in order to
promote the ideal of unfettered discourse, governments must separate the
intent underlying the speech from the speech itself and disregard its com-
municative impact on listeners. Only under extraordinary circumstances
manifesting clear, present, and serious dangers may government intervene
347. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
348. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
349. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 664.
350. Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 Wl.
& MARY L. REV. 329, 344 (1991). D'Amato observed:
When we consider per se harmful words, however, we run up against an indeter-
minate culture that is changing so rapidly in the television age that today's star-
tling expression is next year's parody and the following year's playground yell.
We can follow a given expression through its initial shock value a year ago to
today's rap music lyric and to next year's television commercial. At an accelerat-
ing and almost dizzying pace, our culture is legitimizing expression that in the
recent past it considered outrageous, if not sinful.
Id. at 344.
351. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 632.
352. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
353. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53-55 (1988).
354. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 322 (1988).
355. Insulation of individuals from exposure to this sometimes raucous exchange is not
possible without enforcing some "vision of communal identity." Massey, supra note 2, at
161.
356. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 639. For further development of this
argument, see infra part V.C.
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in public discourse.3 57
Short of such danger, governments may only regulate conduct or con-
textual elements associated with speech, but not the speech itself."' In
these ways, the Court has made public discourse a presumptively pro-
tected realm of activity essentially immune from official intrusion. The
Court's recent decisions in R.A.V. and Wisconsin v. Mitchell dramatically
illustrate just how far this perspective is being brought to realization.3 9
Against these settled principles, any expression, including hate
speech, must be measured.38 0 Before undertaking that task, however, it is
necessary to establish the parameters of public discourse to differentiate,
to the extent possible, open discourse from other protected speech.
B. Limitations on Public Discourse
1. Public discourse must be public
As a matter of doctrine, public discourse must be disseminated pub-
licly. Therefore, speech communicated privately6 1 or in a nonpublic fo-
rum3 62 is beyond public discourse as a matter of definition. The doctrines
of "private" speech and public fora are complicated ones well beyond the
357. Circumstances justifying governmental intervention in public discourse include
the advocacy of imminent lawlessness, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per
curiam); terroristic and similarly violent threats; and uniquely solicitous governmental inter-
ests, like protecting children from child pornography. An example of the last category is the
government's interest in protecting children. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 444 (1982)
(allowing government to ban nonobscene child pornography since such pornography harms
the physiological and mental health of its child subjects); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (allowing government to restrict profane radio broadcasts that are accessible to
children).
358. For a discussion of the limitations of public discourse, see infra part V.B.
359. For a discussion of the Court's current insulation of public discourse from govern-
mental intrusion, see infra part V.C.
360. In R.A.V., the Court clearly reaffirmed its commitment to settled First Amend-
ment principles of neutrality, individualism and diversity. The Court firmly resisted the
temptation to alter the foundation of the First Amendment, by incorporating the egalitari-
anism advocated by proponents of hate speech regulation. See, e.g., Lawrence, Regulating
Racist Speech, supra note 132 (arguing that rules regulating racist speech should be upheld
under the First Amendment); Matsuda, supra note 12 (arguing for criminalization of explic-
itly defined classes of hate speech). Such an alteration would be far-reaching. See Massey,
supra note 2, at 192-95 (noting that assessing the value of speech within public discourse
would allow the pluralistic paradigm to undermine the individualistic principles underlying
the First Amendment).
361. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In Dun &
Bradstreet, the Court recognized that "speech on matters of purely private concern is of less
First Amendment concern." Id. at 759. Accordingly, a defamation award against a credit
reporting agency for false reporting of a company's bankruptcy was sustainable without
proof of actual malice applicable to public defamation. See also Post, Public Discourse,
supra note 2, at 662-63 (extraordinary protection for outrageous or insulting speech extends
only to public, not private, discourse).
362. See generally David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 143 (1992) (evaluating Court's public forum doctrine, and concluding that the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts have converted it from a speech-protective to a speech-restrictive
methodology).
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scope of this article. For purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to
recognize such private or nonpublic speech as limitations on public dis-
course. Public discourse is also distinguishable from other categories of
protected expression that rely on different doctrinal foundations for their
protection, most notably commercial speech36 and pornography.3 6 4 Aside
from such limitations, all other expressions disseminated publicly argua-
bly constitute public discourse. The breadth of public discourse is thus
quite expansive.
Limiting our inquiry to recognizable parameters of public discourse,
it is notable that, under current doctrine, the only recognized limitations
on public discourse concern the manner and context of the speech itself.
Specifically, the only two recognized limitations are imminent violence
and intolerable invasion of recognized personal privacy interests, such as
targeted personal abuse or disruption of residential privacy. Within these
constraints, public discourse constitutes a safe space for unfettered dia-
logue. The boundaries of public discourse are thus located precisely at the
points where the interests of free speech intersect with recognized privacy
interests. In essence, the boundaries of public discourse involve a working
out of the tension between free speech and such individual dignity and
privacy interests.36 5 A brief examination of these limits is necessary to
determine the outer boundaries of public discourse.
2. Imminent violence
Official intervention to prevent imminent violence is a well-recog-
nized limitation of public discourse.366 Imminent violence is a properly
justifiable basis for regulating speech because it is a concrete, particular-
ized threat of serious harm to personal privacy interests 6 7 or to the social
order.3 66
363. Commercial speech was historically beyond First Amendment protection because
it has less value to individuals or society than other core forms of expression. Even today
commercial speech only enjoys intermediate constitutional protection. Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Eberle, Commercial Speech
Paradigm, supra note 65, at 460-69.
364. Pornography is low-level protected speech because it is less central to the core
values of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976).
365. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 680-81.
366. The Court's "clear and present danger" test permits a government to regulate
only speech that is both "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam). Thus, a government can impede public discourse only at the point where such
discourse is about to produce a violation of the law.
367. A government may proscribe "fighting words" because they tend to prompt a
violent reaction in the person to whom they are directed. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
20 (1971). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (creating the fighting
words doctrine). For further discussion of the fighting words doctrine, see supra notes 27-28
and accompanying text.
368. "[W]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the
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3. Invasion of privacy
Doctrinally, the only other recognized basis on which to limit public
discourse is "upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an intolerable manner. 36 9 As forecasted, this limitation neces-
sitates balancing individual free speech rights against individual dignity
or privacy interests. When faced with such a conflict, the Supreme Court
has consistently tipped the scales in favor of speech unless the expression
is so abusive or invasive that it threatens harm to another's person or
freedom. To aid itself when attempting to strike a balance between the
freedoms of speech and privacy, the Court has attempted to ascertain the
line between the two. Two primary rationales have animated the Court's
jurisprudence in this effort. The first rationale, harassment, centers on
whether the abuse is sufficiently focused on a person and sufficiently per-
vasive so as "to alter the conditions of [the target's] employment [or, logi-
cally, other living conditions] and create an abusive working [or other]
environment. '37 0 The second rationale, captive audience, focuses on the
need to preserve personal dignity and privacy interests against unwilling
receipt of intrusive speech.37 1
a. Harassment. Communicative conduct that constitutes intimidat-
ing personal abuse or general discriminatory intimidation may be beyond
the pale of the First Amendment. To place such expression conclusively
beyond the pale, the abusive speech must tangibly interfere with a vic-
tim's life functions, most notably the performance of a job or study.3 2
Doctrinally, recognition of this harm has most notably occurred in the
context of the work environment, where it gives rise to claims under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).2 3 As construed by the
Court, the First Amendment tolerates governmental regulation of abusive
speech that is either directed at an individual target or is so generally
disseminated in the workplace that it discriminatorily alters the work
environment.3 7 4
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,37 5 a leading case in the area of har-
assment, illustrates a government's power to sanction personally abusive
speech targeted at a person in the workplace. In Vinson, an employee of a
power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
308 (1940).
369. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
370. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Hensen v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
371. See Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of city ordi-
nance which prohibited focused picketing outside individuals' homes).
372. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 498.
373. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992).
374. For a discussion of the status of harassment under the First Amendment, see
infra notes 375-85 and accompanying text.
375. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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bank alleged that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor.3 76 The su-
pervisor purportedly made repeated demands, both on and off the job, for
sexual favors, which resulted in the two having sex often over a period of
several years.3 " According to the Court, such speech created a hostile
work environment that was actionable under Title VII because it had the
"'effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment.' ,,31s Although the Court's decision was based on Title VII and
applies to the workplace, its ruling that speech can be sufficiently harmful
to constitute a violation of that law implies that there is no First Amend-
ment barrier to such prosecution.3 7 9 Vinson thus supports the proposition
that speech which "is directed at a targeted individual in an unbearably
offensive manner may be suppressed," as it is outside the scope of public
discourse.38 0 Logically, Vinson should apply to governmental prohibitions
of such speech in contexts similar to the workplace, such as a school or a
campus.
It is equally clear that the government can also suppress abusive
speech that is not targeted at a specific individual if that speech is so
pervasive in effect and influence that it creates "an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment, an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive." 381 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.3 8 2 the
Court found that a claim for sexual harassment could be stated where the
plaintiff and other women were frequently discriminatorily insulted based
on their gender, including sexual innuendo, by the president of the com-
pany for which they worked.38 3 Significantly, the fact that the plaintiff
suffered from general workplace discrimination, rather than solely dis-
crimination targeted specifically at her, was not fatal to her Title VII
claim. Thus, the Court tacitly concluded that such abusive conduct can
involve general workplace discrimination without a specific targeting of
376. Id. at 60.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 65, 73 (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1993)).
379. Massey, supra note 2, at 149.
380. Id. at 150.
381. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993). Significantly, the victim
need not prove that he or she suffered concrete psychological harm. Id. at 370-71. In deter-
mining whether a reasonable person would consider the work atmosphere abusive and hos-
tile, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances of the case. Id. at 371. These
circumstances may include "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance." Id.
382. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
383. Id. at 369. For example, the company president told Harris, "You're a woman,
what do you know" and that she was "a dumb ass woman." Id. In front of others, "he
suggested that the two of them 'go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise.'" Id. The
president also "occasionally asked Harris and other women to get coins from his front pants
pocket" and "made sexual innuendos about Harris' and other women's clothing." Id.
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an individual.3 8 4
In summary, an ascertainable limit on public discourse is found
where the expression or expressive conduct reaches the point that it intol-
erably and abusively targets identified individuals in the workplace or
generally creates an atmosphere which limits a person's ability to perform
job functions. Under these conditions, expression may be curbed to pro-
tect an individual's autonomy.3 8 5 Notably, this regulatory strategy focuses
on the manner and context in which the speech is made, not its content.
b. Captive audience. The captive audience limitation on public dis-
course also concerns the context of speech rather than its content. It has
been described by the principle that government may "shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it. . . upon a showing that substan-
tial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable man-
ner."3 ' The doctrine thus protects people from being compelled to hear
or see messages they wish to avoid but cannot reasonably escape.387 In
essence, however, the doctrine requires auditors to be held hostage to the
message before the speech or expression may be regulated.
Identifying relevant personal privacy interests and circumstances suf-
ficient to justify limitation of exposure to undesired speech is the key to
defining the parameters of the captive audience rationale.3 8 "The Court
has recognized the existence of a captive audience sufficient to support
restrictions on offensive speech in the context of high-school students at a
school assembly, radio broadcasting during the hours in which children
might be expected to be listening, as well as individuals in their
homes." ' 8 In each of these cases, the Court acted upon a desire to protect
individual privacy against unwilling receipt of expression.380 Thus, while
offens ive or undesired speech cannot be curtailed based upon its commu-
nicative impact, it can be regulated with respect to the context of its de-
384. Id. at 370-71. See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that sexual harassment claim met when abusive conduct is so
pervasive as to alter work environment discriminatorily even if not targeted at specific
individual).
385. Logically, the rationale of these cases should apply not only to the workplace, but
to a person's performance of other daily functions.
386. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
387. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("[R]estrictions
have been upheld ... when ... the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwill-
ing viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." (citation omitted)).
388. See Massey, supra note 2, at 192. See also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208-12 (com-
paring nature of nudity in films appearing at drive-in theaters against public's ability to
avoid viewing such nudity by simply averting their eyes).
389. Massey, supra note 2, at 152 (citations omitted).
390. See Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ban against focused picket-
ing outside individual's home); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(upholding school sanctions against student who directed offensive speech "towards an un-
suspecting audience of teenage students"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(commenting that offensive monologues in radio broadcasts can invade privacy of individu-
als in their homes).
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livery when it intolerably invades such recognized privacy interests.
Preserving the sanctity of the home is an especially important inter-
est.3 9 ' Frisby v. Schultz39 2 is a paradigm of this concern for residential
privacy. In Frisby, the Court upheld a content-neutral municipal ordi-
nance which prohibited focused picketing "before or about" the home of
any town resident.3 93 The ordinance interfered with the plans of pro-life
activists who sought to express their views on abortion by picketing on a
public street outside the home of a doctor who allegedly performed
abortions.3
9 4
In evaluating the city ordinance, the Court found it to be content-
neutral,'39 5 thereby avoiding the facial invalidity problems posed by the
ordinances at issue in cases such as Police Department v. Mosley 9 6 or
Carey v. Brown.9 7 Accordingly, the Court subjected the ordinance to the
scrutiny conventionally applicable to traditional public fora.' This scru-
tiny allows a government to impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions that "are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.' '39
Applying this test, the Court first found that the ordinance was narrowly
tailored as it restricted "only focused picketing taking place solely in
front of a particular residence."'400 Next, the Court concluded that the
protection of residential privacy was a substantial governmental inter-
est. 0 1 The Court applied the captive audience rationale, explaining that
citizens have a unique interest in their homes. Homes are often "the last
citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick."'0 2 While public discourse
usually demands that people take their own initiative to avoid unwelcome
speech, dedication does not require unwilling listeners to suffer intrusion
391. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (noting that "[tlhe State's interest
in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest
order in a free and civilized society"). See also Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept.,
397 U.S. 728 (1970) (permitting recipients of unsolicited and unwanted mail to stop mailing
of such material); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (permitting proscription of sound
trucks emitting "loud and raucous" noise).
392. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
393. Id. at 476. This practice is generally termed "focused picketing." Massey, supra
note 2, at 153.
394. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476. Before Brookfield enacted this prohibition, the group of
abortion activists had picketed in front of the doctor's home at least six times. Id. The size
of the group ranged from 11 to 40 persons, and the picketing was generally "orderly and
peaceful." Id.
395. Id. at 482.
396. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting picketing at schools facially invalid be-
cause of exception for labor).
397. 477 U.S. 455 (1980) (following Mosley).
398. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 480-81.
399. Id. at 481 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983)).
400. Id. at 483.
401. Id. at 484-85.
402. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
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or avoid messages while in the privacy of their own homes. 40 3
Nevertheless, it is arguable whether the ordinance was "narrowly tai-
lored to protect only unwilling recipients of the communications.'4'4 A
more probing assessment of the communicative act, like the one under-
taken by the Court in R.A.V., would sharply isolate the specific harms
posed by the act, thereby leading to a more precise regulation of the con-
crete harm apart from free speech rights. If Justice Scalia's method in
evaluating a communicative act, element by element, were applied, the
picketing might more profitably be assessed for its communicative value
than for its proscribable aspects.4 05 Proscribable context elements such as
abuse, harassment, coercion, and undue intrusion could thereby be
weeded out from legitimate communicative elements.
Applying the methodology of R.A.V., the harm reasonably presented
by focused picketing is the unreasonable intrusion into the personal, resi-
dential privacy interests of the target, not the speech itself.40 Thus, gov-
ernments should focus on regulating the unduly intrusive or coercive
elements of the picketing. If these offending aspects can be controlled
through application of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions,
then the remainder is solely the message. 407 Such speech would no longer
implicate the heightened governmental interest in residential privacy.
Thus, the resident would be freed from captivity, and the speaker would
be free to express his or her opinion, even if as a solitary, silent picketer
displaying a sign.408 In short, the listener should properly be protected
from the intrusiveness of the communicative act, but not from any dis-
comfort caused by the communication itself.
Requiring heightened precision in official articulation of the interests
justifying curtailment of freedom of speech is more consistent with the
preferred position of freedom of expression in our hierarchy of rights.40
This approach profitably shifts the focus of regulation to issues of con-
403. See id. ("Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid
speech they do not want to hear, the home is different. That we are often 'captives' outside
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech. . . does not mean we must
be captives everywhere.").
404. Id. at 485.
405. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547-49 (1992). In evaluating the con-
stitutionality of the St. Paul ordinance, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, examined
both the proscribable elements and the communicative value of the expression that the or-
dinance prohibited. Id. Justice Scalia ultimately concluded that the ordinance was invalid
because it allowed St. Paul to suppress the "expression of particular ideas." Id. at 2549.
406. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
407. Id. at 492-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Regulations that might reduce to a reason-
able level the invasion of privacy caused by focused picketing could include: regulating the
hours during which picketing can occur, limiting the number of picketers, or restricting the
noise level of the picket. Id. at 494.
408. Id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
409. For a discussion of R.A.V. and the relation of freedom of speech to a heightened
standard of precision in the articulation of proscriptive statutes, see supra notes 215-34 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of freedom of speech as our preferred right, see supra
part II.
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text, not of content, thereby directing attention to the precise elements of
harm posed by a communicative act. Under the captive audience ration-
ale, such harm will be undue invasion of personal privacy interests, which
occurs when one "cannot practically avoid exposure" to the speech.
410
Short of this criterion, one must ordinarily "avoid further bombardment
of sensibilities simply by averting [one's] eyes"'41 or exiting the area.4 12
To stretch captivity further would, in essence, grant governments or
majoritarian forces the power to censor public debate, thus allowing such
forces to accomplish indirectly, by regulating the context of expression,
that which cannot be accomplished directly by regulating the content of
speech.4
13
C. Separation of Speech from Conduct
The separation of speech from conduct, implicit in the Court's public
discourse jurisprudence, is being brought to full fruition in the Court's
recent cases of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul4 4 and Wisconsin v. Mitchell.41 5
In R.A.V., the Court invalidated the St. Paul bias-motivated disorderly
conduct ordinance because the Court viewed the city's enforcement of the
regulation as aimed at speech. 4 6 By contrast, in Mitchell, the Court sus-
tained the Wisconsin statute, which enhanced criminal penalties for hate-
inspired crimes, because the Court perceived the law as directed toward
conduct.4
7
The difference between speech and conduct, sometimes stark, some-
times obscure, marks the emerging frontier of public discourse jurispru-
dence. 41s Since one can view all words as "simultaneously communication
and social action,"'419 the distinction between speech and conduct may be
less intuitive than it seems. Still, while there is a deep philosophical de-
bate over the quality of speech, as compared to conduct, in the end we
must make sense of our world. Thus, in First Amendment law, even
410. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
411. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
412. See, e.g., id. (stating that persons in courtroom are not captive audience because
they can avoid offense "simply by averting their eyes"). See also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205
(1975) (stating that persons passing adult drive-in theatre are not captive audience because
they do not have to look at nudity on screen). But see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (holding that persons in their home are captive audience even though they could turn
off offensive radio broadcast).
413. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23-26.
414. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
415. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
416. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548-50.
417. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01.
418. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing R.A.V. on the grounds that Wisconsin statute focused
on actors' conduct and not on content of actors' speech).
419. Professor Post characterized social reality in the following manner: "All speech,
of course, is simultaneously communication and social action, and in every day life it is
quite difficult and unusual to separate these two aspects of speech." Post, Public Discourse,
supra note 2, at 640.
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though "[e]very idea is an incitement" to action,420 the Court ultimately
has wisely decided that "[t]he line between what is permissible and not
subject to control and what may be . . . subject to regulation is the line
between ideas and overt acts. '421 While this speech/conduct distinction
may be nothing other than purely pragmatic-a useful organizing princi-
ple-the Court seems increasingly committed to the concept, with some
justification.
Much depends on the distinction between speech and conduct for
purposes of First Amendment law. Doctrinally, speech is presumptively
beyond governmental regulation because choices regarding expression
have been largely left to individuals out of respect for human dignity, the
pursuit of truth, or the concern that governments are too self-interested
to regulate impartially.422 To be protected constitutionally, speech must
possess communicative qualities. 423 For example, the burning of the cross
in R.A.V. possessed clear communicative qualities.4 24 In contrast, to the
extent an act implicates little or no communicative value, there is little
reason to accord it extraordinary protection from governmental regula-
tion. The government has a much stronger reason to regulate behavior or
social action when, like the arson or trespass in R.A.V., the behavior is
non-communicative. Rather than abridging expression, therefore, govern-
ment should effectuate its legitimate interests by regulating conduct to
the extent that it may legally do so.42
5
Still other forms of speech contain attributes of both conduct and
expressive content. Consider once again the conduct attributes of burning
a cross or flag, picketing, or demonstrating by sitting at a lunch counter.
The preeminence of free speech militates against viewing such instances
of speech mixed with conduct as undifferentiated wholes, as "100% ac-
tion and 100% expression. "426 Rather, a more profitable analysis would
adopt the method employed by Justice Scalia in R.A.V., which assessed
420. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
421. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (per curiam) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
422. For a further discussion of this theory, see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying
text.
423. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 369, 376 (1968) (implying that speech
must be an expression of an idea, but finding that not all conduct intended to express an
idea is speech).
424. The City of St. Paul conceded that the burning of the cross expressed a message.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
425. The view that a government should regulate non-expressive conduct without in-
terfering with expressive conduct is consistent with Justice Brennan's dissent in Frisby v.
Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Justice Brennan criticized upholding an anti-picketing statute
because it prohibited all picketing instead of merely regulating the intrusive aspects of the
activity. Id. at 494-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
426. "[B]urning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated
whole, 100% action and 100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same
time communication, and no communication that does not result from conduct." John Hart
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1481, 1495 (1975).
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the communicative act element by element with the view toward separat-
ing proscribable conduct from protected speech elements to the greatest
extent possible.4 27 This technique allows for a probing of official motiva-
tions, and thus yields a more precise understanding of the relationship of
speech to conduct. Such an understanding is extremely important; for, to
the extent possible, speech should be protected over conduct.
From the standpoint of First Amendment doctrine, forcing govern-
ments to focus on conduct rather than speech properly directs officials to
accomplish legitimate goals without suppression of free speech. Real and
serious harms can thus be identified more precisely so that they may be
isolated from expression through direct regulation of the particular
problems resulting from or associated with the speech.
In view of these developments, it seems logical to shift the focus of
regulation from the content of speech to the conduct resulting from the
speech or the particular contextual elements associated with the delivery
of the speech which create serious problems, such as harassment or cap-
tive audience.42 A closer examination of this regulatory strategy is neces-
sary to assess its workability. This examination will begin with a study of
contextual elements and then proceed to discuss regulation of conduct.
1. Context
In public discourse law, the focus of regulation has already substan-
tially shifted from elements of content to those of context. Isolating par-
ticular contextual problems from given speech results in more precise
regulation of the specific harms associated with the speech. The abortion
picketing at issue in Frisby v. Schultz429 provides an excellent example of
how proscribable conduct elements can be effectively separated from pro-
tected expression, and then eliminated through reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions.430
The effectiveness of the regulatory strategy depends upon identifying
those contextual elements which justify regulation. Key to identifying
these contextual elements is the speech/conduct dichotomy. When apply-
ing this dichotomy, it is important to recognize that proscribable context
limitations associated with speech implicate elements of conduct. Harass-
ment, abuse, and captive audience, for example, all contain substantial
traces of conduct. Even imminent violence might be profitably viewed as
a conduct element. This element is demonstrated by the principle that
the advocacy of an idea is constitutionally protected until there is clear
circumstantial evidence that it will lead to overt and imminent acts of
unlawfulness or violence.43 1
427. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2544-45.
428. For a discussion of these problems, see supra notes 372-413 and accompanying
text.
429. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
430. For a discussion of the protected and proscribable elements of focused picketing,
see supra notes 404-10 and accompanying text.
431. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). For example, con-
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Closely evaluating communicative acts for the presence of conduct
elements can lead to more precise identification of the special harms, dis-
tinct from the speech, which justify restricting the communicative act.
Justice Scalia's R.A.V. method of separating expressive acts into proscrib-
able conduct and protected context elements can prove useful in this in-
quiry. The following sections illustrate this technique in relation to
problems of harassment and captive audience.
a. Harassment. As narrowed by the Court, harassment concerns un-
reasonable interference with a person's life functions, most notably in the
area of job performance. 43 2 Viewing harassment against the speech/con-
duct dichotomy, it is plain that harassment is a combination of speech
and conduct. The speech is the utterance of offensive language, such as
the depiction of women as male sex objects in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc. 433 or Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc..434 The conduct ensu-
ing from the speech is the change in behavior caused or sought by the
speech. In short, there is a close nexus between the speech and the action
desired by the speaker or that ensuing from the speech. The speech is a
prelude to and can become integrated into the action.
For example, consider the sexual harassment at issue in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson.43 5 The communicative act consisted of sexual de-
mands made as a condition to obtain or maintain employment. 43 The
communication resulted in the desired act - The supervisor had sexual
intercourse with the employee. 437 The targeted employee's work environ-
ment and life was tangibly altered. Applying the speech/conduct analysis
helps identify the special harms which justify regulation. In situations of
harassment or abuse, these harms include intimidation, coercion, duress,
or other unreasonable intrusions into privacy interests. Once these harms
have been identified, it is easy to justify the government regulation
needed to address them, apart from the expression itself.
b. Captive audience. The captive audience rationale likewise illus-
trates the usefulness of separating speech from conduct for purposes of
simultaneously protecting freedom of speech and personal privacy. The
sider the elements of conduct present in Brandenburg. At the Ku Klux Klan rally, there
were "12 hooded figures, some of whom carried firearms. They were gathered around a large
wooden cross, which they burned." Id. at 445. These conduct elements were unlikely to lead
to outbreaks of violence because no overt unlawful action was foreseeable under the circum-
stances. Accordingly, the rally constituted protected speech. What made the difference was
the nature of the conduct arising from the speech, as much as the speech itself.
432. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986). For a discussion of the
Court's holding in Vinson, see supra notes 375-80 and accompanying text.
433. 114 S. Ct. 367, 368 (1993). For a discussion of the Court's holding in Harris, see
supra notes 381-84 and accompanying text.
434. 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
435. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). For a full discussion of Vinson, see supra notes 375-80 and
accompanying text.
436. Id. at 60.
437. Id.
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essence of the captive audience rationale is that, because the listener is
unable to avoid the message, he or she is held "captive."' 3 It is this con-
duct element of unreasonably forcing the message on an unwilling listener
that justifies limitation on public discourse. Without this limitation on
public discourse, the freedom of the listener would be restricted in such
situations. The speaker hopes to force the target to change his or her view
or behavior. Failing that, the speaker holds the listener hostage until the
desired result is achieved, the speaker tires of being a captor, or the gov-
ernment intervenes. Thus, there is a strong connection between the
speech and the action of inducing a change in opinion or behavior to that
advocated by the speaker. For example, in Frisby v. Shultz439 the speech
advocating cessation of abortions was protected core political or religious
expression. The conduct elements associated with the delivery of the
speech, however, were proscribable. The focused picketing "trapped" the
doctor and his family in their home "in an attempt to force the doctor to
cease performing abortions." '4 4
0
Separating proscribable conduct elements from protected speech ele-
ments can effectively isolate the real harms, leaving the speech itself pro-
tected. Applied to problems of captive audiences, such conduct elements
are likely to be instances of intimidation, coercion, harassment, or unwar-
ranted intrusion into privacy interests, such as the right to enjoy the
peace of one's home. Controlling these offending elements through appli-
cation of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, as described
above, can effectively protect the message without harming the listener."41
Thus, more precise regulation of harms associated with speech may be
achieved without damage to speech interests. This can lead to a more
precise accommodation of speech rights in relation to legitimate govern-
mental interests.
2. Conduct
No clearer illustration of the Court's desire to separate speech from
conduct exists than in the recent cases of R.A.V. and Mitchell. These
cases explain that while a government may not regulate undesirable
speech,442 a government may regulate undesirable conduct.443 The cases
thus illustrate the preferred treatment of the problem of hate-inspired
conduct under American free speech principles: Governments may regu-
438. "The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as
intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech." Frisby v. Sch-
ultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
439. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). For a complete discussion of Frisby, see supra notes 392-95
and accompanying text.
440. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487.
441. For a further discussion on the use of such regulation, see supra notes 404-10 and
accompanying text.
442. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 ("Content-based regulations [of speech] are presump-
tively invalid.").
443. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2195.
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late conduct ensuing from speech, but may not abridge the speech itself.
Again, while the line between speech and conduct may not always be a
bright one, these cases usefully illuminate one clear boundary. A precise
analysis of the facts at issue demarcates this boundary. In Mitchell, the
defendant was convicted of aggravated battery.44 By operation of the
statute, his sentence was increased to seven years for his part in inten-
tionally selecting the victim based on race.44 5 The defendant and several
members of a group of young black men and boys were discussing a scene
from the movie "Mississippi Burning." This scene depicted a white man
beating a young black boy who was engaged in prayer. 46 Shortly after
this discussion, the group saw a young white boy walking toward them
from across the street. When the boy passed the group, the defendant
said, "You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get
him. '447 At the defendant's direction, the group rushed at the boy and
beat him severely.446 The attack rendered the boy unconscious, and he
remained in a coma for several days thereafter. 4 " The facts at issue in
Mitchell objectively concern overt conduct, the physical commission of
criminal battery. In comparison, the facts at issue in R.A.V. constituted
both speech and conduct. The burning of the cross was a protected sym-
bolic speech element.450 St. Paul attempted to regulate cross burning
under its ordinance prohibiting racially motivated fighting words, thus
giving rise to the First Amendment issue.4 51 Other aspects of the R.A.V.
defendant's act constituted proscribable conduct: Terroristic threat, ar-
son, and criminal damage to property are all criminal offenses.4 2 Com-
paring R.A.V. to Mitchell, it is plain that the only thing separating the
two cases is the attempted prosecution in R.A. V. of the cross burning on
speech grounds, since adequate conduct grounds existed for legitimate
criminal prosecution. This clear distinction between speech (the symbolic
burning of the cross) and conduct (the criminal assault or battery) prop-
erly delineates a boundary between speech and action.
Obviously, the separation of speech from conduct cannot always be
made so cleanly as in R.A. V. and Mitchell. Much expression contains a
more "opaque" mixture of speech and conduct. Despite the difficulties
such mixtures may pose, when a category has combined elements of
speech and conduct, it is important to perform a careful assessment of
the communicative elements involved. However, that is why we have
judges-to exercise reasoned judgment with wisdom and prudence. As
stated previously, Justice Scalia's element by element approach would be
helpful in making such an assessment of the division between communi-
444. Id.
445. Id. at 2196.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 2196-97.
448. Id. at 2197.
449. Id.
450. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2540.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 2541 n.1.
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cative elements and noncommunicative elements of a particular
expression.
Applying Justice Scalia's technique to Mitchell, one must determine
whether the penalty enhancement feature of the Wisconsin law punishes
conduct, bias, or offensive thought.453 Under Wisconsin law, a non-bias
motivated assault "ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of two years'
imprisonment."'4 54 A Wisconsin statute, however, provided that this pen-
alty could be enhanced in cases where the perpetrator selected the victim
based on bias.4 5 This was the case in Mitchell. Both the assault and the
discriminatory selection were necessary to make out the bias or "parallel"
crime.456 Thus, the penalty enhancement feature relied on some underly-
ing free-standing provision of the criminal law.457 It cannot be disputed
that the only difference between conventional criminal conduct and bias-
motivated conduct is the discriminatory motive of the perpetrator. Thus,
the bias is in essence the "second tier" mens rea necessary for the penalty
enhancement.458
The issue thus centers on the statute's regulation of discriminatory
motive. To the Wisconsin Supreme Court, such regulation conjured up
images of Orwellian thought control.459 The court further expressed its
contempt of the statute by stating that "in a Free society, one's beliefs
should be shaped by his mind. . . rather than coerced by the State. '460 If
the statute did indeed coerce an individual's mind, then the United
States Supreme Court's upholding of the statute would seem to allow a
government to accomplish indirectly what R.A.V. prohibits it from ac-
complishing directly. The critical factor is the distinction between
thought and action.
To a unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
453. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the statute "violates the First
Amendment directly by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought."
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811-12 (Wis. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
The court rejected the state's assertion "that the statute punishe[d] only the 'conduct' of
intentional selection of a victim." Id.
454. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 695.
To establish a bias crime, therefore, the prosecution must prove two essentially
unrelated mens rea elements. The first of these is the mens rea that is applica-
ble to the parallel crime; for example, the specific intent to commit an assault.
Because this is foundational to the bias crime, I call this the 'first-tier' mens rea
for a bias crime. In addition, the prosecution must demonstrate that the accused
was motivated by bias in the commission of the parallel crime. This is the 'sec-
ond-tier' mens rea required for a bias crime.
Id. at 699-700.
458. Id. at 700.
459. The term "Orwellian images" refers to George Orwell's pictorial creation of a to-
talitarian future where private thoughts were discoverable by the government. GEORGE
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
460. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993).
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Mitchell raised no such specter of thought controlled censorship because
the statute was a permissible content neutral regulation of conduct and
because motive is relevant to the commission of criminal conduct apart
from any First Amendment concern.46' Laws directed at conduct can
properly effectuate legitimate governmental interests without abridging
free speech rights. Indeed, apart from abridging any such rights, such
laws may even "incidentally" affect speech interests-channels explicitly
left open by the Court in R.A. V.46 2 The key factor is how the government
acts.
Assessing motive as a consideration to which a government may wish
to attach importance, it is noteworthy that "motive plays the same role
under the Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidis-
crimination laws, which . . .make it unlawful . . .to discriminate 'be-
cause of. . .race, color, religion, sexual or national origin.' "463 Indeed, if
punishing motive is considered thought control for purposes of the First
Amendment, then it would appear that the foundation for the Civil
Rights laws is invalid, since those laws are founded on the specific mens
rea of bias.464
Considering more precisely the First Amendment interest posed by
punishing motive, "abstract beliefs . . . may not be taken into considera-
tion by a sentencing judge" in isolation-to prove nothing more than a
defendant's thoughts or beliefs.465 However, such beliefs might be consid-
ered to the extent they are relevant in assessing the motivation for the
crime. 466 Motive is often relevant in fixing punishment for a crime.46 7 De-
fendants may receive minimum sentences because they acted with good
motives, or maximum sentences because they acted with bad motives.466
"[T]he more purposeful. . . the criminal conduct, the more serious is the
offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.' 664 In
light of this principle and practice, the bias motivation for the crime in
Mitchell was relevant in assessing the defendant's motive and assigning
an appropriate sentence for the crime.
As applied to bias-inspired conduct, aggravated punishment is thus
justifiable because "this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual
461. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
462. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
463. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
464. See id. at 2200-01 (discussing the applicability of First Amendment rights to Civil
Rights law violations).
465. Id. at 2200.
466. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983) (plurality) (stating that sentencing
judge may take into account defendant's racial animus toward victim). See also Lawrence,
Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 695 (citing testimony of Professor Tribe and
Floyd Abrams that bias motivation may be considered as a factor in sentencing but not as
an element of crime itself).
467. Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 717.
468. 1 WAYNE R. LEFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6(b)
(1986).
469. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987)).
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and societal harm. For example, . . . bias-motivated crimes are more
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on
their victims, and incite community unrest. '470 Accordingly, "[t]he State's
desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation
for its penalty enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement
with offenders' beliefs or biases."47'
Key here is the resulting harm from the crime itself, which reasona-
bly is greater than a nonbias assault. A mere assault creates harm
through the fear or fright it engenders in the victim. 7 2 However, the ra-
cial nature of a bias assault creates greater harm because it singles out
victims by race, triggering a victim's self-image of subordination or
powerlessness. 473 It may undercut one's dignity or sense of self-worth,
perhaps resulting in "spirit-murder." 44 Of course, other assaults might
also heighten the quality of harm suffered. For example, assault by a gun
arguably seems worse than assault by a heavy book. Significantly, by fo-
cusing on the quality of the harm resulting from the act, a reasonable
differentiation among acts can be achieved independent of the speech.
Therefore, the proper focus of governmental efforts to suppress bias-mo-
tivated conduct is to punish appropriately that conduct and even enhance
such punishment if appropriate. The speech, however, should not be
silenced.
Still, while adequate in so far as it goes, the Court's opinion does not
go far enough in explaining why Mitchell does not implicate First
Amendment interests. Greater analytical precision is necessary to police
this boundary between speech and conduct. The most important distinc-
tion between Mitchell and R.A.V. is that in Mitchell there is no evidence
that the state sought to suppress speech impermissibly.4 5 For example,
unlike the situation in R.A. V.,47 6 in Mitchell there was no evidence of
viewpoint discrimination or other form of censorship. On its face and as
applied, the Wisconsin statute objectively punished overt conduct, not
speech. Biased thought is relevant only to the extent it is acted upon and
results in proscribable criminal conduct. Once the conduct has occurred,
the bias motive becomes relevant only in fixing punishment for the act.477
Significantly, the bias motivation is properly taken into account in sen-
470. Id. at 2201. Ironically, these are the same essential arguments put forward by
proponents of hate speech regulation. For a discussion of the intense emotional reaction
engendered by racial hatred, see supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text. The difference
in treatment of the arguments is the speech/conduct distinction, as illustrated in the differ-
ence between R.A.V. and Mitchell.
471. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
472. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(c) (1962) ("A person is guilty of assault
if he ... attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury.").
473. Williams, supra note 209, at 127. For a discussion of the injurious consequences
of racial hatred, see supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
474. Id.
475. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01.
476. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
477. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01.
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tencing, but not as a separate element of a crime. 478 The penalty enhance-
ment feature relies on an underlying provision of the criminal law.
Therefore, a penalty enhancement does not, in itself, create a thought
crime. So viewed, there is a clear separation between speech and action.
To accomplish this clear separation of speech and action, the Wis-
consin statute was carefully drafted and mirrored the language used in
most antidiscimination laws. 47 '9 An important aspect of the Wisconsin law
is that it did not require judges to probe a perpetrator's mind for bias or
other motivation. The language of the statute applied the penalty en-
hancements when the perpetrator "intentionally select[ed]" victims be-
cause of bias.480 Under this language, the state could prove the requisite
intent through prior discriminatory acts, such as a showing of a pattern of
selecting victims based on race or other bias. Thus, the law could be ap-
plied by focusing solely on conduct, not speech. Alternatively, speech
could be used at most as circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory
intent.481 Significantly, this focus on conduct substantially removed the
First Amendment concern possibly implicated by the statute: the official
policing of thought.
The facts of Mitchell illustrate how focusing on conduct precludes
the policing of thought. The defendant in Mitchell was liable for selecting
his victim regardless of any bias-inspired motive he possessed. Although
478. Id. at 2199-2200. However, some state hate crime regulations create new crimes
which incorporate the bias element. Some of these statutes directly punish speech, present-
ing quite dramatic First Amendment problems. For example, some statutes have outlawed
cross burning. See IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987); MONT. CODE § 45-5-221(2) (1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080(2)(a) (West Supp. 1992). In view of R.A.V., these statutes are
no longer constitutional.
479. The Wisconsin law was based on the model hate crime statute designed by the
Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Wis.
1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
480. Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90) (providing penalty enhancement for underlying
crime when victim intentionally selected based on race, religion or other status).
481. Comments by the dissenting Mitchell Justices illustrate the use of circumstantial
evidence to prove discriminatory intent. Justice Bablich stated:
Admittedly, the conduct prohibited by the penalty enhancer statute can be
proven by an extensive combination of facts that might include words uttered by
a defendant. However, if words are used to prove the crime, the words uttered
are not the subject of the statutory prohibition; rather, they are used only as
circumstantial evidence to prove the intentional selection.
Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 822 (Bablich, J., dissenting). Justice Abrahamson's statements also
further this point:
The statute requires the state to show evidence of bigotry relating directly
to the defendant's intentional selection of this particular victim upon whom to
commit the charged crime. The state must directly link the defendant's bigotry
to the invidiously discriminatory selection of the victim and to the commission
of the underlying crime.
Interpreted in this way, I believe the Wisconsin statute ties discriminatory
selection of a victim to conduct already punishable by state law in a manner
sufficient to prevent erosion of the First Amendment protection of bigoted
speech and ideas.
Id. at 819 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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Mitchell pointed out the victim to his friends, Mitchell himself did not
participate in the attack.482 There was even evidence indicating that
Mitchell did not possess the motive actually to attack the victim. 48 3
Significantly, for First Amendment purposes, it did not matter under
the Wisconsin statute whether Mitchell was subjectively motivated by ra-
cism or a desire to steal the victim's tennis shoes. He "objectively" pos-
sessed the specific intent necessary for the underlying crime of assault
and battery. He was liable "objectively" under the statute based on his
actions. The intentional selection of the victim based on race was a sepa-
rate, or second-tier, mens rea relevant to the bias motivation. This prop-
erly enhanced the penalty for the underlying criminal conduct.
There was no communicative value to Mitchell's actions. He was
punished for a racial act, not for any racial statement.4 84 So construed,
the Wisconsin statute operated directly on conduct, and not on speech.
Even if one construes the government's consideration of motive as trig-
gering First Amendment concerns, it is at most an "incidental" effect on
speech in a law demonstrably aimed at conduct. A clearly identifiable
governmental interest of substantial magnitude, securing equality under
the law, exists apart from suppression of the speech. s5
Alternatively, assuming "incidental" effects on speech, enhanced
punishment of racially discriminatory conduct should reasonably pass
scrutiny under the tests applicable to both subject matter and viewpoint
discrimination as developed in part IV. First, considering such govern-
mental action as subject matter discrimination, the action would seem to
survive traditional strict judicial scrutiny since it is narrowly tailored in
furtherance of the compelling end of securing equality under the law, as
conceded by the Court in R.A.V.48 6 and Mitchell.4s7 Second, assuming se-
lective application of a penalty enhancement law to punish only messages
of hate, the "exacting scrutiny" applicable to viewpoint discrimination
482. Id. at 809.
483. When his friends charged the victim, Mitchell yelled "you should leave that boy
alone. Afterwards, he called the police and apologized." Jeffrey Rosen, Bad Thoughts; Court
Watch-U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Upholding Wisconsin Hate Crime Law, THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC, July 5, 1993, at 15.
484. For further discussion distinguishing the statutes at issue in R.A.V. and Mitchell,
see supra notes 475-77 and accompanying text.
485. Under this analysis, since "the State's regulation is not related to expression...
the less stringent [four-part] standard," of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) would control. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). The O'Brien standard
allows governmental regulation when
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial government interest; if the government interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id.
486. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538 at 2549.
487. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. For development of the strict scrutiny test applicable
to subject matter discrimination, see supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
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might also be satisfied. As developed by R.A.V., such viewpoint discrimi-
nation may "be employed only where ... necessary to serve the asserted
[compelling] interests." 488 There can be no less restrictive, content-neu-
tral alternative to enhancing punishment of discriminatory conduct.
Thus, this may be the only way of effectuating the governmental interest
in securing equality. If such is the case, then the statute would pass even
the more exacting scrutiny required for viewpoint discrimination.
In contrast to the non-communicative act in Mitchell, there was
strong communicative value to the burning of the cross in R.A. V.41 While
there is also bias motivation in the perpetrator's selection of the victim
based on race, this motivation is not linked to an underlying parallel
crime, as in Mitchell. Thus, the bias motivation at issue in R.A. V. is rele-
vant only as punishment of the speech itself.490 Plainly, therefore, R.A.V.
involves proscription of speech, whereas Mitchell involves only conduct.
Additionally, the Wisconsin statute requires that discriminatory inten-
tions be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,4 1 a standard appropriate to
criminal conduct in a society constituted on due process. Consequently,
the danger of unrestrained inquiry into thought processes is further mini-
mized. In summary, the Wisconsin statute provides a narrow, carefully
crafted way of treating bigotry, isolating the serious concrete harm from
legitimate First Amendment rights.
Ultimately, therefore, the Wisconsin statute at issue in Mitchell ap-
propriately expresses our society's high commitment to the ideals of
equality and racial, religious, and ethnic harmony.49 2 This seems the
proper place to effectuate Fourteenth Amendment equality concerns:
where they most matter, in channeling behavior. Thus, First and Four-
teenth Amendment freedoms need not be mutually incompatible; R.A.V.
and Mitchell illustrate a way in which they may be fulfilled in harmony.
VI. HATE SPEECH AND PUBLIC DisCOURSE
Having evaluated the contributions of R.A.V. to First Amendment
law, this discussion must now assess the treatment of hate speech in view
of American free speech principles. This part of the article employs an
approach previously advocated in this article: separating the content of
speech from any particular problems associated with the specific context
in which it is delivered. This approach isolates the harms associated with
speech so that a close regulation of them might be achieved. The result is
a better accommodation between free speech rights and legitimate gov-
ernmental interests. Part VI.A first discusses how hate speech should be
treated under the First Amendment. Part VI.B addresses the specific con-
488. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852
(1992) (plurality) (alterations in original)).
489. Id. at 2542.
490. Id. at 2548.
491. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 485 N.W.2d 807, 818-19 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J., dis-
senting), reu'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1994).
492. Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 721.
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textual problems associated with the burning of a cross in the dead of
night within the fenced yard of a neighbor.
493
A. Hate Speech and Public Discourse
In view of American public discourse law, hate speech should ordina-
rily be allowed free dissemination, like other offensive, outrageous, insult-
ing, or disquieting speech. This does not mean, however, that every forum
or every manner of dissemination should be available. As are other forms
of public speech, hate speech is subject to recognized limitations. For ex-
ample, hate speech may not incite an immediately violent response nor
substantially invade a person's privacy interests in intolerable ways.494
Subject to these constraints, however, hate speech should have its forum,
fitting within the presumptively protected realm of public discourse.
In constitutionally protecting hate speech, we as citizens are not un-
sympathetic to the very real personal or social harm that might result
from this expression, nor do we encourage or desire that people be rude,
crude, or hurtful to others. Rather, our deep commitment to free speech,
itself deeply constitutive of our society, teaches that such messages of
hate are better confronted openly in the free exchange of ideas rather
than silenced through the force of law. Unfortunately, the personal hurts
caused by hate speech are an inevitable byproduct of our commitment to
such unfettered discourse,4 95 like the hurt feelings of auditors of plainly
"offensive" speech, the emotional distress suffered by Jerry Falwell on
account of Hustler Magazine's advertisement parody,49 6 or the other inev-
itable slings and arrows borne by participants or subjects of public
discourse.
Certainly the history of American free speech provides solid reasons
for allowing hate speech its forum. First, the record of governmental regu-
lation of ideas is, with a few exceptions, an especially dismal one.497 Gov-
493. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
494. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1971).
495. Massey, supra note 2, at 166 ("In doing so, the Court has implicitly endorsed the
idea that truly autonomous self-governance requires that the nature of individual identity
be constantly placed at issue.").
496. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). For a more complete discussion
of Falwell, see supra notes 331-51 and accompanying text.
497. This explains the evolution of the "clear and present" danger test in the Bran-
denburg Court's drawing of the line of constitutionality on the basis of abstract advocacy of
ideas as compared to overt actions. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Too often "clear and present" dangers were in the eye of the beholder, serving as pretexts to
strike disfavored messages. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (uphold-
ing indictment of Communists on assumption that their teachings constituted clear and pre-
sent danger to state security); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding
conviction of protestors of World War I draft on theory that their advocacy represented
clear and present danger). A notable exception to this dismal record of official regulation of
speech is the area of commercial speech, where governments have generally performed well,
perhaps because they are less self-interested in this area. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1982); Eberle, Commercial Speech Paradigm, supra note
65, at 470-73.
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ernments and majoritarian groups have an inherent self-interest in
tailoring speech to suit their purposes or in otherwise censoring as a re-
sponse to strong social pressures.498
Second, offensive, outrageous, insulting, or hateful speech is particu-
larly susceptible to suppression since this form of expression graphically
calls into question settled ideas or practices.4 9 Confronted with embar-
rassing disclosure or comment, it is natural for censors to respond by
censoring.
Third, it is always risky categorically to exclude any area of speech
from the critical scrutiny of free debate. Without a demonstration of
clear, concrete harms posed by the speech, there may be no logical basis
on which to distinguish such speech from otherwise protected speech. In
view of the difficulty of drawing a line between protected and unprotected
speech, any benefit to be derived from excising particular speech from the
public vocabulary hardly seems worth the cost of imprecise regulation.
Inevitably, these efforts tend to curtail our commitment to an uninhib-
ited, robust exchange of views. °00 It thus seems preferable to direct a reg-
ulatory strategy to the actual concrete harms presented by the speech,
such as regulating the conduct ensuing from the speech or the particular
context problems.
Fourth, categorically regulating hate speech undercuts the personal
and collective autonomy values that support free speech, both as a means
to democratic self-government and as an end in itself. 0 1 Since Cohen v.
California,502 the Court has been committed to placing the basic decision
as to the content of public discourse in the hands of individuals because
of its commitment to human dignity and self-determination.503 Reducing
the scope of free speech violates those concepts, since it impinges upon
every member of society. °50 Thus, even if offensive or hateful speech
would not seem to merit protection for its own sake, it must be protected
as a necessary by-product of placing the reins of expression in the hands
of individuals. 50 5
Fifth, it is constructive for individuals to vent their messages of ha-
tred. Theoretically, allowing all speakers a basic right to be heard impli-
cates the core autonomy and self-realization concepts of speech. Of
498. Eberle, Commercial Speech Paradigm, supra note 65, at 475.
499. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 632.
500. Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay On Professor Bickel,
Justice Harlan, And the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE LJ. 283,
300 [hereinafter Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse]. Certainly there is little value to indi-
viduals or society in having people disseminate vicious racial prejudice and invective. Id.
The reasons for protecting hate speech thus lie more in structural protections of speech
(e.g., our concern with censorship and keeping the lines of communication open) than any
value in the speech itself.
501. For a discussion of how free-speech supports personal and collective autonomy,
see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
502. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
503. Id. at 24.
504. Massey, supra note 2, at 168.
505. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse, supra note 500, at 299.
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course, there is little true autonomy at the root of vicious messages of
racial prejudice; rather, such is the product of distorted thinking. Unfor-
tunately, it is possible that some individuals will render satisfaction to
hate speakers by listening to them. However, such speaker autonomy can
defuse social conflict
because people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them
if they have a part in the decision-making process. . . . [Free speech]
thus provides a framework in that the conflict necessary to the progress
of a society can take place without destroying the society. It is an essen-
tial mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and
change.506
The alternative, repression, "breeds hate" and "menaces stable govern-
ment. ' 507 Thus, even if one finds little value in hate speech itself, allowing
hate speakers their forum is better than the alternatives.
Still, while these are all good reasons for protecting hate speech, it
seems more persuasive to offer positive justifications. Ultimately, hate
speech should be protected for its own sake because it reveals important
truths about our world. Through hate speech we learn about the ugliness
of the world. We learn about the ugliness of speakers' messages or minds,
thoughts grounded in ugly ideas, such as racism, sexism, genocide, or eth-
nic cleansing.508 Unfortunately, our world, or part of it, is still ugly. So
long as this remains the state of affairs, ugly speech must have its forum.
"[T]o reduce the ugliness of the Nazis' speech [or other hate speech]
would only conceal the real ugliness of their ideas. '50 9 As with human
nature, it is better to confront such hard truths than to repress them.
Silencing hate speech dangerously misleads us from the fact that such
ugliness exists. It is healthy to be reminded of the reality that the world
is ugly.
Ultimately, therefore, the truth is too important to suppress. We
need truth to recognize evil in the world. Only by recognizing evil, can we
face it and hope to change it. Thus, there is a place for this speech in the
marketplace of ideas because it helps us "to reject false, ugly ideas by
506. EMERSON, supra note 66, at 7.
507. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely sup-
posed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.
Id. Justice Black's admonition is also worth noting: "I do not believe that it can be too often
repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First
Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to
the ideas we cherish." Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
508. Farber, Utilizing Public Discourse, supra note 500, at 301.
509. Id.
1994] 1207
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
revealing them for what they are."51 0 In the honesty of revelation, we may
actually be able to create more real tolerance and respect for others.511 In
this sense, Justice Kennedy is quite right: "To endure the speech of false
ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how to
live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open discourse
towards the end of a tolerant citizenry. 512
Ultimately, true civility in discourse will come only through realiza-
tion of true civility in society. 13 Only through a change of nature and
conduct can this come about. Thus, the real response to hate speech is to
change the world. This may occur through confronting the ugliness of
hate speech through open debate. For example, counter-speech remedies
might include public denunciation of hate and bias, educational teachings
about the evil of bigotry and the need for maturity and tolerance in re-
sponding to it, or public demonstration of support for diversity and mu-
tual respect. It is fair to question whether we have been forceful enough
in our condemnation of hate and bias.114 Additionally, efforts at changing
conduct might effectively fight hate and bias. For example, efforts di-
rected to combatting bias might provide for equal opportunities in em-
ployment, housing, and other essentials to a good life and a great society.
In short, the focus should shift to realizing justice, not restricting
freedom.
Of course, this depends on a basic confidence in the ability of people
to understand and act upon what they hear, a certain faith in ourselves
that we can determine best the uses to which ideas and information freely
available should be put.5 15 Certainly this view animates the Court's vi-
sion . 6 Hopefully, such faith is well placed. Hopefully, we are strong or
wise enough to shrug off half-baked ideas or debased messages. Hope-
fully, in the process we will become a more capable and tolerant citizenry,
learning perhaps "extraordinary self-restraint. . . to develop and demon-
strate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social en-
counters,' ' 51 cultivating in the process desirable virtues, such as fairness,
toleration, self-restraint, or prudence.5 1 8 Hopefully, we can change the un-
510. Id. at 303.
511. Massey, supra note 2, at 128.
512. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992).
513. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse, supra note 500, at 302.
514. Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech, supra note 132, at 476.
515. Eberle, Commercial Speech Paradigm, supra note 65, at 456 (evaluating Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1979)).
516. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (noting that the right of free
expression was intended to place "the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into
the hands of each of us"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (discussing the purpose of free speech rights as envisioned by the drafters).
517. BOLLINGER, supra note 88, at 10, quoted in Massey, supra note 2, at 129.
518. Id. In Dean Bollinger's theory of free speech, "the highest purpose of free speech
is that it enables the society professing to protect it to cultivate the virtues of tolerance and
self-restraint." Massey, supra note 2, at 129 (citing BOLLINGER, supra note 88, at 10). "[T]o
accomplish these aims it is necessary to allow the most distasteful ideas to be aired, for that
act of societal toleration is laden with heuristic value." Id. For Bollinger, thus, "'toleration
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derlying conduct that leads to hate.
However, even if such faith is not justified, there is a certain skepti-
cism, even fatalism, implicit in the view of free expression as an end in
itself. For in a certain sense, do we really have any other choice? "If in
the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only mean-
ing of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
way.,,1519
B. R.A.V. and Public Discourse
While hate speech should have its forum, it is not necessary that
every forum be available for vilification. R.A.V. illustrates this aspect of
speech at the frontiers of modern law. For while messages of hate are
constitutionally protected under settled First Amendment principles, a
more precise focus on the particular conduct ensuing from that speech or
from contextual problems associated with specified hate communications
can lead to a more precise identification of the harms at issue, as well as
their proper accommodation in relation to free speech rights. For exam-
ple, hate speech inciting violence, terror, or unreasonable intrusion into
recognized privacy interests might legitimately be beyond the pale of the
First Amendment. Again, more careful evaluation of communicative acts,
to separate proscribable from protectable elements, can effectively isolate
specific harms from the message itself.
In applying this technique to the facts of R.A.V., it is necessary to
evaluate the burning of a cross in the dead of night, "inside the fenced
yard of a black family that lived across the street" from one of the perpe-
trators.520 Such symbolic communication can only be understood as a
message of hate directed at the victims targeted. Although messages of
hate may not be censored based on their communicative impact on listen-
ers,521 the communicative act or acts at issue in R.A.V. were not pure
speech but a mixture of speech plus conduct, presenting both protected
speech elements and proscribable conduct elements. While the hate mes-
sage merits constitutional protection, the criminal conduct does not.
Under R.A.V.'s regulatory strategy, speech is to be separated from
conduct. Speech is presumptively protected public discourse; conduct,
however, is proscribable. Government has legitimate incentives to fashion
behavior, not communication. Let us apply this rationale to the conduct
at issue in R.A.V., determining what contextual limitations on public dis-
course apply to justify limitation of this speech.
of undesirable and unwanted behavior' operates as a method to control and channel the
impulses and capacities of the societal members by 'pointing up troublesome tendencies
within those wishing to be intolerant, often by the community's engaging in self-restraint
toward the very behavior it seeks to avoid.'" Id. (quoting BOLLINGER, supra note 88, at 238).
519. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
520. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
521. Id.
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1. Imminent violence
On the facts presented in R.A.V., a black family, the Joneses, had
recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood in St. Paul only
to be confronted with a cross burning in their fenced-in yard one night.5 22
The cross had been placed there by a group of white youths, which in-
cluded the defendant, Viktora, and Miller, a white neighbor of the
Joneses.52 3 In view of our country's history of lynchings, beatings, and
other reprisals against African-Americans, the burning cross was reasona-
bly a racial threat to the Joneses to move out of the neighborhood or else
face risks of violence or physical harm.
On these facts, the perpetrators committed the crimes of terroristic
threat and assault. The terroristic threat was the "threat. . . to commit
any crime of violence [arson, criminal damage to property] with the pur-
pose to terrorize another [the Joneses]." 52' The assault was the "attempt
by physical menace [arson and trespass] to put another [the Joneses] in
fear of imminent serious bodily injury. ' 525 The perpetrators' intentional
frightening of the Jones family constituted legitimately proscribable ele-
ments since they threatened violence and physical harm. Indeed, Viktora
did not contest the city's charge of racially motivated assault.2 1 More-
over, one of Viktora's accomplices, Miller, pleaded guilty to conspiring
"to interfere with the Jones family's right of access to housing by intimi-
dation and the threat of force. '527 Miller acknowledged "the crosses were
burned with the intention of scaring the Jones family into moving be-
cause they were African-Americans. "528
2. Invasion of privacy
The perpetrators' act can also be evaluated to determine whether the
cross burning unduly invaded the Joneses' recognized privacy interests.
This claim might be made out on the basis of either the harassment or
captive audience rationale.
a. Harassment. The conduct aspect of burning a cross in a family's
private fenced-in yard might reasonably constitute harassment, intimida-
tion, or personal abuse which has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with the family's living environment, transforming that envi-
ronment into a threatening, fearful, or hostile one. One is guilty of harass-
ment if one taunts another in a manner likely to provoke a violent
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1962).
525. Id. § 211.1(1)(c).
526. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.2.
527. Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 702-03 n.112. The offense
was based on the federal housing law, 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988). Lawrence, Punishing Bias
Crimes, supra note 19, at 702-03 n.112.
528. Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 721.
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response. 529 Taunting a family in the privacy of their home by burning a
cross in their yard at night is likely to lead to that result.
Alternatively, the conduct constituted intimidation, which "criminal-
ize[s] words used to coerce others through fear of serious harm, [when]
* * . it is clear that the words are purposely or knowingly used by the
accused to produce a fear and that the threat is real." 30 Here the expres-
sive conduct was concededly used to produce fear.
53 2
In short, conduct-like harassment, intimidation, or coercion designed
to force the Jones family to move alters their living environment and goes
beyond protected communication. Such coercion reasonably presents spe-
cial harms apart from the expression. Governments can legitimately ad-
dress these conduct-based harms through reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions. For example, the forum for cross burning could shift
from the night to the day and from the family's home to the town square.
b. Captive audience. A similar analysis might apply to the captive
audience rationale. Again, while the underlying message is protected
speech, there is no justification for holding the family hostage to the mes-
sage. Under the captive audience rationale, one can shut off undesired
messages by posting a no solicitation sign at one's house, by informing the
post office of the desire not to receive unwanted mail, 533 or by turning off
"loud and raucous" noises.5 34 Likewise, one should reasonably be able to
prevent the receipt at home of other undesired messages, like cross burn-
ings or lynchings by effigy. "Preserving the sanctity of the home . . . is
surely an important enough value" 535 to warrant shutting off undesired
discourse or limiting it pursuant to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. Any person is entitled to shut the door to a raucous world.
Thus, the act of invading another's home is beyond public discourse.
Alternatively, a persistent pattern of cross burning or similar conduct
just outside the family's property line, on a public sidewalk, for example,
could effectively trap the family in the house, holding them hostage to the
message until the desired behavior, moving out of the neighborhood, is
achieved. Controlling the offending conduct elements (intimidation, coer-
cion or duress) through reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
529. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4(2) (1962).
530. Lawrence, Punishing Bias Crimes, supra note 19, at 704 (footnote omitted).
532. Id. at 702-03 n.112.
533. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding
statute under which citizen could have name removed from vendor's mailing list).
534. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding statute forbidding the use of
sound truck on public streets). But see Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (rejecting captive audience rationale concerning utility company's
insertion of materials advocating nuclear power development in its billings). The Court in
Consolidated Edison reasoned that customers could "escape exposure to the objectionable
material simply by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket." Id. at 531.
Consolidated Edison illustrates that the concept of "captivity" cannot be extended to cut
off any undesired speech.
535. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
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(for example, regulating the hours during which picketing could occur,
the number of participants, or the noise level) can separate the specific
harms from the message itself, leading to more precise accommodation of
speech rights in relation to legitimate governmental interests.
CONCLUSION
In R.A.V. the Court struck another mark in our commitment to the
idea that free speech should embrace all the ideas which we may need to
solve the exigencies of our time. Throughout the twentieth century the
Court has striven to realize this ideal of unfettered discourse, freeing indi-
viduals to think as they like, speak as they like, and discourse freely, in-
dependent of governmental or community control. Out of commitment to
this ideal, it is hoped that true, autonomous self-determination over one's
life, society, and culture might be achieved. Structurally, the Court has
sought to achieve this end by carving out expression as a protected haven,
insulated from any pressure or coercion except the force of a better argu-
ment. R.A.V.'s protection of hate speech even over substantial personal
rights illustrates the depth of the Court's commitment to these ideals.
Illustrating this commitment, R.A. V. transforms our concept of pub-
lic discourse. Perhaps most strikingly, R.A.V. signals an enhanced com-
mitment to the view that free speech is valuable as an end in itself,
independent of any consequences that might follow, including tangible
personal or social harm. So viewed, free speech is constitutive, an essen-
tial part of a just and free society. Accordingly, judgments about the use
or abuse of speech are primarily entrusted to individuals, not govern-
ments or majoritarian institutions.
Under this regime of free speech, majoritarian preferences must be
expressed primarily through education or counter-speech unless such
remedies are wholly unworkable because of exigent circumstances mani-
festing identifiable clear and present dangers to persons or society. The
lesson of R.A.V. and Mitchell is that governments should effectuate their
legitimate interests mainly by regulating conduct, not speech, and
thereby focus their attention on legitimate goals apart from suppression
of speech. In R.A.V., the Court demonstrates just how high the standard
is to which it will hold governments to realize this principle.
A consequence of this perspective is the Court's increasing separation
of speech from conduct. In R.A. V., the Court went so far as to scrutinize a
communicative act, element by element, disentangling protected speech
elements from proscribable conduct elements even with respect to sym-
bolically expressed fighting words, a category of expression hitherto
thought to be beyond the scope of the First Amendment. Thus, as envi-
sioned by R.A.V., speech is to be viewed as independent of action to the
extent possible, notwithstanding the very difficult judgments to be made
in implementing this principle.
In view of these developments, it now seems logical to shift the strat-
egy for regulating public discourse from the regulation of the content of
speech to regulation of the conduct resulting from the speech or of any
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problematic contextual elements associated with the delivery of the
speech. This regulatory strategy can better focus governmental efforts on
legitimate harms to society apart from the content of the expression it-
self. Thus, a more precise accommodation of First Amendment rights in
relation to legitimate governmental interests can be achieved. In this way,
the full promise of the First Amendment might be realized.
Certainly free speech is the preferred right in our constitutional
structure and the preeminent organizing principle of American society.
The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence maps out our quest to be
free from convention, from order, and from control. No other country ac-
cords expression such an exalted status. Ours is certainly "an experiment,
as all life is an experiment." 536 Hopefully, we are wise enough to recognize
the responsibility that goes with such freedom.
536. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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